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This report presents a set of general risk-management countermeasures 
for reducing the incidence of speed-related unsafe driving actions (UDAs). 
The countermeasures were developed by the staff of the Policy Analysis 
Division of The University of RIichigan Highway Safety Research Institute 
(HSRI) under National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
contract No. DOT-HS-7-01797. Two other reports present the results of 
supporting substudies. These reports are: 
Volume 11: 
A Review of Selected Literature, and 
Volume 111: 
A Definitional Study of Three Unsafe Driving Actions. 
In i t i a l ly ,  t h r e e  UDAs were  considered as possible targets  for 
countermeasures to be developed under this contract. These UDAs were: 
speeding, following too closely, and driving left of center. Later, as a 
result of the substudy reported in Volume 111, i t  was decided that  the 
countermeasure targets be limited to speed-related UDAs because of the 
relatively low level of risk created by following too closely and dr iv in~;  
left of center. 
OBJECTIVES 
The general objective of this project was to  identify general risk 
management countermeasures that will reduce the incidence of unsafe 
driving actions. The focus of the countermeasure development effort was 
on speed-related UDAs. Specific objectives were to: 
e select promising countermeasuress; 
e assess the potential utility and the feasibility of t h e  
countermeasures; 
e refine the promising countermeasures and specify a set of 
recommended countermeasures; and 
specify t es t  requirements for determining the highway 
safety impact of the countermeasures on the incidence of 
speed-related UDAs. 
BACKGROUND 
Studies that  have examined traffic crash causation have consistently 
shown that unsafe driving actions are a major cause of t r a f f i c  crashes. 
NHTSA, as part of a broad research and action program to reduce the 
traffic crash risk, has sponsored a series of studies to identify the risk 
associated with unsafe driving actions and to develop methods to reduce 
their occurrence, Unsafe driving actions that  occur frequently, a re  
involved in serious crashes, and appear to result from driver decision- 
making, were established as a priority for early study. The premise was 
that reduction of the incidence of such actions should reduce the overall 
crash risk. Further, acts resulting from deliberate driver decisions should 
be more susceptible to  intervention through safe driving conformance 
strategies than nondeliberate acts committed by a driver. 
Earlier studies (Hiett et  al. 1975) developed initial definitions of unsafe 
driving actions. Other studies (Lohman et  al. 1976) attempted to  assess 
relative priority among the various unsafe driving acts in the context of 
the rate of involvement in crashes. These studies led NHTSA to identify 
three types of unsafe driving actions for more detailed examination. These 
three UDAs were speeding, following too closely, and driving l e f t  of 
center. 
Two studies were then planned to be conducted in parallel. One study, 
?'Police Enforcement Procedures for  Unsafe Driving Actions," (contract  
number DOT-HS-8-01827) was designed to  review and assess police 
enforcement strategies and tactics for the three UDAs. The second (this 
study) was entitled "Identification of General Deterrence Countermeasures 
for Unsafe Driving Actions" and was designed to develop a broad range of 
coun te rmeasures  not limited to  those operated primarily by  police 
enforcement or other legal-sys tem agencies. To underline this distinction, 
we have substituted the term ''general risk management" for the term 
"general deterrence," which is a term of art applied to specific strategy 
employed by legal system agencies. The nature of the general deterrence 
strategy and its relationship to other possible strategies against UDAs are 
described in Chapter Two, 
Our two UDA studies s tar ted  i n  1977. As they began, it became 
apparent that  the existing definitions for t h e  t h r e e  UDAs lacked  
operational specificity. In order to develop adequate estimates of the risk 
posed by the particular acts and to determine the nature and extent  of 
current responses, adequate operational definitions were necessary. Thus, 
an initial task of both the Police Enforcement project and the so-called 
General Deterrence project was to  develop operational definitions and 
preliminarily assess the risk associated with each to the three UDAs. This 
effort was primarily conducted under the General Deterrence project. The 
initial results are reported in Volume I11 of this report.  NHTSA had 
recognized the need for better definitions and better data on the unsafe 
driving actions prior to the start of the two projects discussed above. A 
third project was developed by NHTSA to develop such information for a 
broad range of unsafe driving actions. This study, enti t led "National 
Analysis of Unsafe Driving Actions and Behavioral Errors in Accidents" 
(Contract number DOT-HS-8-02023), was started in the fall of 1978 and 
involved the study team members of the present project. 
The management and technical direction of the three projects was 
coordinated at  NHTSA and HSRI. The results of the definitional studies 
established in earlier findings that the following-too-closely UDA was a 
priority UDA were not supported, particularly when the UDA is defined in 
legal terms, as is relevant for police enfdrcement action. Also, the 
driving-left-of-center UDA did not appear to result from the type of driver 
decision-making process that was reasonably susceptible to  new-driver- 
oriented interventions. For example, many crashes that involve driving left 
of center occur through loss of control by the driver. The driver did not 
deliberately plan to drive left of center. (Chapter Three of this report 
discusses these points in greater detail.) The definitional studies also 
showed that the speeding UDA in all its forms was a significant factor in 
traffic crashes. These findings led NHTSA and HSRI study team members 
to focus the first two studies primarily on the speeding UDA. The third 
study continues to examine a broader range of unsafe driving actions and 
will lay the foundation for future studies that will address strategies and 
tactics to reduce the occurrence of high-priority UDAs, 
SCOPE AND APPROACH 
After completion of the definitional study, the project focused on 
driver-oriented countermeasures against the speeding unsafe driving action. 
Emphasis was placed on conscious and intentional commissions of the U D A  
rather than on nondeliberate occurrences due to driver inattention, 
distraction, impairment, and other factors. 
As noted earlier, our countermeasure development effort concentrated 
on what we have termed general risk-management countermeasures. 
Such countermeasures are aimed at managing traffic crash risk caused by 
the speeding U D A  by influencing the behavior of drivers who have not 
necessarily been detected committing the U DA. General deterrence is only 
one approach to achieving such influence. It attempts to influence 
behavior by creating a perception among drivers that they will be caught 
and punished by the legal system if they engage in the UDA. It is, in 
essence, a negative strategy. It tries to make the perceived negative 
consequences of a U D A  (for example, a fine imposed by a traffic court) 
outweigh the perceived positive consequences of the act  (for example, 
decreased travel time). 
Our study includes general deterrence countermeasures, but is not 
limited to them. Other negative approaches not requiring legal system 
action are considered along with positive approaches that provide rewards 
or incentives for not committing the UDA. Chapter Two describes the 
various strategies we used in generating countermeasures. 
Our study approach involved the task areas depicted in Figure 1-1. 
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countermeasure problem within the context of the highway-saf ety process 
that deals with the traffic crash risk. The risk-management construct 
developed by the coprincipal investigators (see, for example, Joscelyn and 
Jones 1978) was the basis for this framework. It was expanded to include 
explicit driver-decision components and led to the identification of four 
basic strategies for countermeasures for the speeding UDA. 
A l i te ra ture  survey was conducted concurrently with the conceptual 
framework development. The survey sought information for use in 
developing the framework and was in turn guided by the framework itself, 
which identified key areas where substantive information was needed. Two 
of these areas, decision-making and social-control processes, were explored 
in depth to identify major theories, concepts, and principles that  would 
help in creating countermeasures based on a firm scientific foundation. 
This review is presented in Volume I1 of this final report. Abstracts of 
a r t i c les  and reports on specific countermeasure concepts were also 
prepared for use by the project staff. 
The definitional study of speeding, following too closely, and driving 
left of center  followed. It drew upon information provided by the 
literature survey and also used data taken from HSRI1s accident files. The 
study developed rigorous definitions of the terms used to describe traffic 
crash risk, provided a narrat ive description of the three UDAs, and 
developed quanti tat ive data describing the crash risk and associated 
characterist ics of the UDAs. It recommended that  countermeasure 
development efforts under the contract  focus on speed-related UDAs 
because of their higher risk. The definitional study is presented as the 
third volume of this final report. 
The nex t  major  t a sk  area  was the development of a series of 
preliminary countermeasure concepts against the speeding UDA. The 
concepts were based on ideas from a wide variety of sources, including 
technical reports, journal articles, scientific literature from the behavioral 
sciences, newspaper stories, discussions with colleagues and practitioners, 
and suggestions that NHTSA had received from its staff and from others. 
The concepts were presented in a working paper that described each 
concept and i t s  method of application, indicated its primary target and 
user groups, and discussed key operational factors and their possible effects 
on feasibility, effectiveness, and efficiency of the concept. 
The countermeasure concepts report was sent to a panel of researchers 
and practitioners in related fields for review and comment. The report 
was also circulated within NHTSA to obtain comment. Reviewers were 
asked to assess each concept with respect  to  (1) i ts  e f fec t s  on the 
incidence of speeding if it functioned as intended, (2) the likelihood that it 
could be designed and implemented to function as intended, (3)  problems 
that might occur in developing and operating the countermeasure, (4) cost 
and other resource requirements, (5) development time, and (6) data needed 
to make more accurate estimates of effectiveness, feasibility, and cost. 
The comments of the reviewers proved extremely useful in refining both 
the substance and the presentation of the countermeasures. The reviews 
indicated a need to present not only countermeasure elements that could 
be incorporated into ongoing countermeasure efforts in a jurisdiction, but 
t o  se lect  several countermeasure programs combining the elements in a 
way that would enhance their total effect on the speeding U D A .  The 
refined countermeasures are presented in this dual format in this report. 
The final substantive task area in the project was to develop a set of 
requirements for testing and evaluating the countermeasure programs. The 
requirements were stated in terms of measures of effectiveness, evaluation, 
design, and efficiency considerations. 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT 
This volume is presented in seven chapters. Following this introduction, 
Chapter Two describes the conceptual framework for the study and states 
the four risk-management s t ra tegies  that  were used in generating the 
countermeasures. Chapter Three summarizes the major findings of the 
definitional study. Chapter Four describes seven countermeasure elements, 
and Chapter Five identifies and assesses three countermeasure programs 
that  combine these elements. Test and evaluation requirements for the 
countermeasure programs are presented in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven 
sets forth the major conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The development of optimal strategies to reduce traffic crash risk 
requires a framework for examining the many interacting factors that 
influence the generation and control of that risk. This chapter describes 
such a framework that has been used by the authors in past highway 
safety research. The implications of the framework are stated, and basic 
strategies for reducing the incidence of speed-too-fast UDAs are defined. 
THE CONCEPT OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
The Highway Transportation System and i t s  Output 
The first element of our conceptual framework is the nation's Highway 
Transportation System (HTS), consisting of highways, vehicles, and users, 
plus their supporting elements. The primary objective of the HTS is to 
provide fast ,  convenient road transportation, but i t  also has many 
secondary objectives such as providing recreation and pleasure for drivers, 
providing a market for the automobile transportation industry, and 
supporting the national economy. 
The HTS produces both positive and negative output in the course of its 
operations. Its positive output (called utilities) include individual mobility, 
rapid transportation of goods, and social and economic well-being. 
Foremost among its negative output (called d i s u t i l i t i e s )  are deaths, 
injuries, and damage to property due to highway crashes. Other disutilities 
of the HTS include environmental pollution, depletion of natural resources, 
and disruption of social patterns. 
In this project, disutilities generated by the driver component of the 
HTS are of concern. The target disutilities are crash losses brought about 
by UDAs, but the specific target of the UDA countermeasures is the 
driver. Countermeasures may also be directed against intermediate targets 
(e.g., passengers, employers) who may influence driver actions. 
Utilities associated with the UDAs must also be considered. For speed- 
too-fast UDAs these may range from a perceived reduction in travel time 
to peer group approval for "cheating deathn by driving at  high speed. 
Risk and Exposure 
The concept  of risk is useful in  dealing with the uncertainties 
surrounding the occurrences and consequences of highway crashes. In our 
conceptual framework, risk is defined as the probability of the occurrence 
of an event that will produce disutility. The event can be the crash itself 
or the consequences of the crash, e.g., loss of life or property, injury, etc. 
The event can also be defined in terms of the individual who causes it to 
occur and in terms of the conditions under which it occurs. In short, risk 
can be defined at any level of detail that suits a particular analysis. 
Clearly, the longer the time period during which an event can occur, 
the greater the probability that it wil l  occur. Time, in this case, is a 
measure of exposure. Traffic crash risk is thus a function of driving time 
or of the time period during which a person might drive or be exposed to 
crashes caused by other drivers, Traffic crash risk can also be expressed 
as a function of the time period during which some specific driving 
activity is occurring, e.g., the time spent driving in excess of 70 mph. 
Since distance is a function of time for any given speed history, miles 
traveled can also be used to measure exposure except for the trivial case 
where a vehicle is not moving (e.g., stopped at a stop light). 
Thus, risk cannot be completely defined until the risk event and 
exposure are defined. The definition of exposure must specify both the 
nature and amount of the exposure. The definition of the risk event must 
si~ecify the type of crash loss and conditions under which the loss can 
occur. A complete statement of risk might read, then, as follows: 
The probability that any licensed driver will cause a fatal  
accident during a one-year period is ,0004. 
Here, the undesirable event is "a fatal accident caused by any licensed 
driver1' and the exposure is one year. The statement implies that the risk 
is that of "any licensed driver,'l all of whom comprise the llpopulation at 
risk." The population at risk could also be defined as the individuals who 
might be killed, injured, or suffer property damage in a fatal accident. 
A more specific statement of risk must be made when defining the risk 
created by a given driving action. For example, such a statement might 
read: 
The probability of a fatal accident caused by a given driving 
action committed by any driver who commits that action 
continually for a period of one year is 0.10. 
In this report we call this a statement of conditional risk because it 
specifies the risk of a fatal crash, given the condition that the driving 
action is being performed, The population at risk is composed of drivers 
who commit the driving action. If the population at  risk were redefined 
to consist of all licensed drivers, then the risk statement should read: 
The probability of any licensed driver being involved in a fatal 
crash caused by a given driving action in a one-year period is 
,004. 
We call this type of risk unconditional risk because it is not known 
beforehand whether a member of the population at risk is performing the 
specified driving act or even driving at all during the one-year period. 
In many fields a term called a hazard ra te  is used as a key parameter 
of risk when risk is a continuous function of time. Hazard rate is 
measured in terms of number of risk events (termed l1hazardsU in this case) 
per unit time per member of the population at risk, Volume I11 explains 
the relationships between hazard rate and risk. The term is widely used in 
such diverse fields as reliability engineering, systems safety analysis, 
epidemiology, demography, and the actuarial sciences. It has not been 
widely used in highway safety, although it is ideally suited to describing 
many types of traffic crash risk, including that created by the so-called 
nondiscrete unsafe driving actions that are the subject of this study. 
Risk Management 
Society, as individuals and through its institutions, attempts to manage 
risk-producing factors so as to reduce the frequency of occurrence of 
events that produce disutility and to minimize loss if the events do occur. 
Through this process of risk management, society seeks to reduce risk to 
a t o l e r a b l e  level rather than to eliminate risk entirely. What is 
fftolerableff is a complex balance between what society perceives to be the 
utility and the disutility of various elements or practices of the Highway 
Transportation System (HTS), 
Our conceptual framework identifies a set  of public and private 
institutions that practice risk management on a more deliberate basis than 
private citizens or society as a whole. Some of these institutions are 
linked together by formal and informal working arrangements to form 
discrete, identifiable risk-management systems. An example of a formal 
risk management system is the nation's traffic law system consisting of the 
s ta te  and local agencies that generate and enforce traffic laws; that 
determine the guilt or innocence of individuals accused of violating the 
laws; and that impose sanctions on those found guilty of violations. 
Risk management systems also include parts of formal systems that 
have their primary focus on broader aspects of society (e.g., health care 
delivery systems) and less formalized systems (e.g., the media used for 
public education and information). Many societal influences (e.g., customs, 
ethics, mores, folkways, family structures, and peer pressures) are based on 
the principle of risk management. 
Formal risk management systems attempt to reduce the disutility of the 
HTS by exerting control forces on the HTS. Such forces include legal 
sanctions against drivers found guilty of proscribed high-risk behavior (e.g., 
speeding), mass-media messages about the nature of HTS risk (e,g., how 
many people are killed each year in crashes involving speeders), and new 
methods of reducing the consequences of crashes after they have occurred 
(e.g., faster delivery of injured persons to medical facilities). The control 
forces result from pressures exerted by society as a whole in response to 
its perception of highway crash risk and t o  its weighing of disutility 
against utility. Such pressures may call for new laws, institutions, or 
methods; for the more effective and efficient application of existing tools; 
or for the expenditure of additional resources. 
Risk management systems operate under a fundamental constraint in 
their application of control forces. The constraint limits control forces to 
those which themselves generate no more disutility than will be tolerable 
to society. For example, lowering the national maximum speed limit to 30 
mph would reduce fatal crashes greatly, but would not be accepted because 
of the high disutility associated with the action itself. In this example, 
the perceived disutility generated by the control force would be greater 
than the perceived disutility of speed-related crashes and the control force 
would be rejected by society, 
A rational process for risk management includes the following six steps 
(Joscelyn and Jones 1978): 
1. Identification of risk, 
2 .  Establishment of priorities among risk, 
3 .  Selection of risk-management strategies and tactics, 
4 .  Determination of allocation of resources, 
5 .  Implementation of risk-management actions, and 
6 .  Evaluation of outcomes in terms of risk reduction. 
The development of countermeasures for the speeding UDA involves all 
of these steps, but our study is most concerned with the f irst  four. 
Considerations about implementation and evaluation are limited to key 
issues governing feasibility and to the requirements for designing future 
test and evaluation programs. 
DRIVER DECISION BASIS 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the development of risk- 
management strategies to reduce the incidence of UDL4s should start with 
an understanding of the factors that  create the risk. Since we have 
defined a UDA as an act that flows from conscious decision-making by a 
driver, we can describe the decision process to encompass a balancing of 
equities. 
It may be useful to think of the creation of the risk of a U D A  as 
emerging from two steps: 
1. A human decision yields the unsafe driving act. 
The human decision results from a balancing of the utilities 
and disutilities associated with the UDA. If the perceived 
utilities outweigh the perceived disutilities, the U D A  is 
committed. Note, that such a balancing process is not 
necessarily deliberate or even f'rationalfl in the usual sense 
of the word. Also, the utilities and disutilities associated 
with a given act  are  not necessarily the same for all 
individuals. See Volume I1 of this report for further 
discussion of decision-making models, 
In equation form, the balancing step may be represented as: 
where u ,  to u, represent the range of positive expected values associated 
with the U D A  and d l  to d ,  represent the range of negative expected 
values flowing from the UDA. 
One may influence the decision either by reducing the total utility (a 
positive strategy in our terms) or by increasing the disutility (a negative 
strategy). Past approaches to highway safety have focused almost entirely 
on increasing the disutility. The primary emphasis has been on the use of 
the traffic law system to sanction offenders to create the general 
deterrent threat of law action if a U D A  is undertaken. The threat of 
traffic law system action is only one of the disutilities considered by a 
driver in making a decision. There are many more that are not usually 
considered in developing highway safety countermeasures. Examples of 
these disutilities are given in the next subsection. 
BASIC STRATEGIES 
This section identifies and describes four basic risk-management 
strategies for speed-too-fast UDAs. The strategies are based on the 
considerations discussed in the two preceding sections. 
The emphasis is on general strategies that follow the process illustrated 
in Figure 2-1. As the figure indicates, a driver's decision about whether to 
engage in a UDA is influenced by information on the outcomes of his 
past UDAs, the outcomes of UDAs by other drivers, and risk-management 
actions taken prior to his UDA. Special risk management is seen to be 
only one part of the general strategy, generating information about UD As 
a f te r  a UDA has been commit ted  and d i scovered .  Genera l  r i sk  
management makes use of additional information provided to the decision- 
maker (i.e., the driver) prior to the ffinterceptionff of a UDA. 
Strategy I - Decrease the Utility of Committing the UDA 
In this strategy a favorable balance between utility and disutility is 
obtained by decreasing the utility the driver receives from committing the 
UD-4. As a result, the driver associates a net disutility with the UDA and 
decides not to commit it. For example, if the motivation behind the UDA 
is to reduce travel time and thereby be rewarded with money or peer 
approval, then this s t ra tegy calls for the reward to  be reduced or 
eliminated. 
The reduction in utility must be perceived by the driver as being of 
sufficient magnitude to swing the balance of his utility-disutility equation 
to a "no-gou condition. Education and information countermeasures could 
be used to create such a perception even i f  the actual decrease in the 
reward were too small to create the desired effect. On the other hand, 
countermeasures to reduce the actual reward from the UDA would require 
an education and information component to make the undesirable outcome 
of the UD44 known to the driver prior to his committing the UDA. 
Strategy 11 - Increase the Utility of Not Committing the U D A  
This strategy focuses directly on safe driving as a desirable behavior. 
In effect, it offers a reward for such behavior with the reward being of 
sufficient magnitude to offer more utility for not committing the U D A  
than for committing the UDA. 












Figure 2- 1.  General Risk Mcnagernent of Individual UDAs. 
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I i d 
Again, both the perceived and actual rewards of driving safely can be 
increased through this strategy. Education and information components are 
required in either approach, but are more important if perceived rewards 
are the target. 
Strategy I11 - Increase the Disutility of Committing the UDA 
This is the classical negative approach to behavior modification. It 
operates on the principle that  a driver contemplating a UDA will be 
deterred if the driver believes the negative results of the action will be 
greater than the positive results. It then concentrates on increasing the 
former so as to tip the utility-disutility balance to favor a no-go decision 
by the driver. 
In t h e  pa s t ,  t h e  Tra f f i c  Law System (TLS) has been the risk- 
management system that  society has relied on most in applying this 
strategy to unsafe driving. When applied by the TLS, general risk 
management is called "general deterrence," 
However, negative approaches do not have to rely on the TLS. Other 
risk-management systems have appeal because they are not bound by the 
constraints of the TLS which require the fundamental protection of the 
Constitution. For example, insurance "systemsu can impose punishments (in 
the  form of ra te  increases) without following the s t r i c t  procedural 
formalities required of the TLS. 
Analogous to  Strategies I and 11, both the perceived and actual  
punishments may be increased through this strategy. Deterrence theory 
(and common sense) dictates that the approach will be most effective when 
both occur. 
Strategy IV - Decrease the Disutility of Not Committing the U D A  
In this strategy the disutility the driver associates with not committing 
the UD-4 is decreased sufficiently to create a favorable balance in the 
utility-disutility equation. 
For example, a driver might believe he would lose his job i f  he were 
late to work and thus might attach a high disutility to observing the speed 
limit. For this example, a possible countermeasure might be to persuade 
the employer not to fire the tardy driver but to seek other ways to 
encourage punctuality. Countermeasures to decrease the perceived 
punishment for safe driving would also be possible under this strategy. 
We note that Wilde and his associates in Canada also have developed 
independently a similar set of strategies (called tactics) of human-oriented 
highway-safety countermeasures (Murdoch and Wilde 1980). These 
investigators have pursued a line of research similar to ours over the past 
several years and use many of the elements that we have incorporated into 
our risk-management paradigm. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of risk management provides a useful framework for 
generating and assessing countermeasure concepts for reducing t h e  
incidence of speed-too-fast UDAs. The framework indicates that risk- 
management strategies aimed at  the human component of the Highway 
Transportation System should seek to achieve a favorable balance between 
the utilities and the disutilities that a driver associates with such UDAs. 
Four possible strategies are suggested for striking such a balance. 
1. Decrease the utility of committing the UDA. 
2 .  Increase the utility of not committing the UDA. 
3 .  Increase the disutility of committing the UDA. 
4. Decrease the disutility of not committing the UDA. 
CHAPTER THREE 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS O F  SPEEDING, 
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY, A N D  DRIVING LEFT O F  CENTER 
The first step in applying the risk-management concept to this study is 
to define the risk to be managed. The results of our effort to develop 
operational definitions of the three subject unsafe driving actions (UDAs) 
are summarized in this chapter. The detailed results of the definitional 
study are presented in Volume 111 of this final report. 
This chapter also presents the results of a preliminary risk analysis of 
these three UDAs. Risk figures are presented in terms of percentage of 
all crashes in which the UDA is a cause. The figures are taken from the 
definitional study reported in Volume HI and are based on data presented 
in the literature and on special analyses of existing accident files at  HSRI. 
Finally, this chapter briefly summarizes the characterist ics of crashes 
involving these UDAs and indicates the degree to which the UDA-caused 
crashes were conscious and intentional. 
SPEEDING 
TWO types of speeding UDAs were identified: the absolute-speed UDA 
and the relative-speed UDA. The absolute-speed U D A  is defined as 
follows: 
The absolute-speed UDA is the act of driving a vehicle at  a 
speed in excess of a maximum legal limit,  or ,  i n  a normal 
driving environment, at a speed below a minimum limit. 
Speed in this case is measured relative to the roadway. The limit may be 
set by any legally recognized authority. A tfnormaltf driving environment is 
that associated with roadway usage under baseline or design conditions, for 
example, dry pavement, no construction, tfaveragetf traffic density, etc. 
Examples of the absolute-speed UDA include: 
e driving any vehicle above the 55 rnph national maximum 
speed limit; 
e driving any vehicle above the posted maximum speed limit 
in a school zone during specified hours; or 
e driving a special vehicle (e.g., a tandem-trailer gasoline 
transport) above the legal limit for that class of vehicle. 
The relative-speed UDA was defined as: 
The relative-speed UD-4 is the act of driving a vehicle a t  a 
speed that is so different from the speeds of vehicles around it 
that the risk of a traffic crash exceeds that which is societally 
tolerable. 
Here, speed is measured in one of the following ways: 
1. As a difference in absolute speeds between two vehicles. 
2 .  As a difference between the absolute speed of a subject 
vehicle and the mean speed of a sample of vehicles that 
contains the subject vehicle. This difference may be 
expressed either in units of speed (e.g., miles per hour) or 
in units of standard deviation from the mean of the 
sample of vehicles. 
Subject to other conditions defined below, we assume that the relative- 
speed UDA occurs when the speed of the subject vehicle is greater than a 
speed not being exceeded by ninety-five percent of vehicles in the traffic 
stream. A relative-speed U D A  also occurs where the speed of the subject 
vehicle is less than a speed being exceeded by ninety-five percent of 
vehicles in the traffic stream. Examples of the relative-speed UDA are: 
A vehicle traveling 35  mph when ninety-five percent of the 
vehicles in the same traffic stream are traveling 5 0  mph or 
more. 
A vehicle traveling 50 mph on an expressway when ninety- 
five percent of the vehicles in the same traffic stream 
have slowed to 35  mph because of snow. 
The absolute-speed UDA is reflected i n  speed limit laws, whereas the 
relative-speed UDA is dealt with by such laws as those prohibiting driving 
too fas t  for conditions and reckless or careless driving. Relative-speed 
UDAs are also reflected in speed limit laws in most jurisdictions because 
of the methods that are used to set and enforce the limits. Such methods 
result in the establishment of speed limits at the eighty-fifth percentile 
level (Joscelyn, Jones, and Elston 1970). 
Three classification rules were defined to make the definitions mutually 
exclusive. They are: 
R u l e  1: The absolute-speed condition dominates the relative- 
speed condition for maximum speed limits. 
R u l e  2: The relative-speed condition dominates the absolute- 
speed condition for minimum speed limits, 
R u l e  3: Poor driving conditions (e,g., icy roads) remove 
minimum speed limits. 
The results of applying these rules to various combinations of conditions 
are summarized in Table 3-1. 
The fftoo fastf1 and fftoo slowff dimensions of speed-related UDAs require 
that we explicitly define another toplevel variable for classifying UD As. 
This variable classifies all speed UDAs as either speed-too-fast or speed- 
too-slow and leads to the following four types of speed UDAs: 
Type 1 - too fast, absolute 
Type 2 - too fast, relative 
Type 3 - too slow, absolute 
Type 4 - too slow, relative 
Table 3-2 shows the estimated involvement percentages of these four 
types of speed UDAs in the general population of nonpedestrian crashes 
nationwide. All types combined appear in about 2896 of such crashes. 
Speed-too-slow UDAs occur in 10% of these; speed-too-fast UDAs occur 
nearly twice as often (18%) as speed-too-slow UDAs. Some 10% of the 
speed-too-fast UDAs a re  classified as absolute (Type l),  and 8% a re  
relative (Type 2). The data did not permit the speed-too-slow UDAs to be 
broken down further into absolute or relative categories. 
Characteristics most common among all types of crashes caused by 

TABLE 3-2 
ESTI?+IATES OF CRASH INVOLVEJENT FOR 
SPEED-RELATED UDAS 
Tvpe of Speed U D A  
1-Too fast, absolute 
2-Too fast, relative 
3-Too slow, absolute 
4-Too slow, relative 
Percent of .U Crashes 
C 
Range 
All too fast (Types 1 & 2) 
All too slow (Types 3 & 4) 
All absolute (Types 1 & 3) 











Source: Treat e t  al. 1980 
speed-too-fast UDAs (i.e., Types 1 and 2) are listed in Table 3-3. The 
table also lists characteristics that tend to distinguish crashes caused by 
speed-too-fast UDAs from other crashes. Detailed breakdowns of crash 
characteristics by type of speed-related UDA are not available. 
Our analyses indicate that speed-too-fast UDAs and each of their 
component types are overwhelmingly conscious and intentional. Our 
clinical assessments suggest that impairment (e.g., by alcohol) is a major 
factor in the relatively small percentage of unconscious and unintentional 
speed-too-fast UDAs that cause crashes. 
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY 
Our definition of following too closely (FTC) is as follows: 
The FTC UDA is the act of driving a vehicle following another 
vehicle such that the time separation between the two vehicles 
is so short as to create a societally unacceptable level of 
crash risk. 
ffFollowingff is defined as driving at  about the same speed as a lead vehicle 
when both vehicles are in the same lane of traffic. "Time separationu is 
defined as the distance between the two vehicles divided by their speed. 
The time separation consists of two major components, a component due to 
the reaction time of the following driver and a component due to the 
difference in braking capacity of the two vehicles. Generally speaking, 
time separations should be greater than one to two seconds to avoid an 
unacceptably high risk of an FTC-caused crash. 
Note t h a t  this definition explicitly excludes instances of "gross 
inattentionTf and that the term flreaction timeff includes a component for 
allowing a driver to recognize a stopping maneuver by a lead vehicle. 
Thus, actions involving a delayed response by a following vehicle to a 
stopping or stopped vehicle are excluded from this category of UDAs. 
About one percent of crashes nationwide involve this UDA as a causal 
factor. Characteristics associated with FTC crashes are listed in Table 3- 
4. Such crashes are predominantly of the low-severity, rear-end type 
involving young males on straight-and-level stretches of four-or-more-lane 
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  O F  CRASHES CXUSED BY 
S P E E D - T O O - F A S T  UDAS 
MOST FREQUEhT VALUE 
CRASH RELATIVE TO VALUE FOR 
VARIABLE FlOST FREQUENT V'UUE CRASHES IN GENERAL 
Crash Seve r i ty  Low Very High 
No. of Vehicles 
i n  Crash 
Impact Configur- 
a t  ion  
Dr iver  Age 
Dr iver  Sex 
Road Type 
Road Lane Con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  
About t h e  same f o r  
one and more than one 
I n t e r s e c t i n g  
Young 
Ma1 e. 
C i t y  S t r e e t s  




Secondmy and I n t e r -  
s t a t e  
Four-lane divided and 
Two-lane 
Road Alignment S t r a i g h t  and l e v e l  Curves and/or  h i l l s  
P r e c i p i t a t i o n  None Rain E Snow 
S O U R C E :  Jones, Treat, and Joscelyn 1980 




C H A U C T E R I S T I C S  OF CRASHES CAUSED BY F T C  UD,4s 











MOST FREQUENT VALUE 
RELATIVE TO VALUE FOR 
MOST FREQUENT VALUE CRASHES IN GENERAL 
Low Low 
Multiple Multiple 
Rear end Rear end 
Young Young 
Male No difference with 
respect to  sex 
City s t r e e t s ;  Interstate & turnpike 
U.S. & s ta te  turnpike 
Four or more lanes, Four or more lanes, 
divided and nondivided divided and nondivided 
Straight and level Straight and level 
None Rain 
SOURCE:  J o n e s ,  T r e a t ,  and J o s c e l y n  1930 
city streets and turnpikes. Data suggest but do not show conclusively that 
FTC UDAs are most often the result of conscious and intentional driver 
actions. 
DRIVING LEFT OF CENTER 
The definition used for this UDA is as follows: 
The DLOC UDA is the act of driving a vehicle over or on the 
center line of a two-way, two-lane road when not passing or 
turning. 
We est imate that about ten percent of all crashes nationwide involve 
this UDA as a cause. Crashes that  were caused by a noncontact,  
ftphantomll vehicle are included in this figure. 
DLOC crashes tend to  be much more severe than other types of 
crashes (see Table 3-5). Most often, DLOC-caused crashes involved more 
than one vehicle on two-lane, straight-and-level city s t ree t s  i n  any 
weather. However, DLOC-caused crashes occurred more frequently on 
curved or hilly country roads and state secondary roads than did crashes in 
general. Snowy weather also was overrepresented in DLOC-caused crashes. 
There are strong indications that drivers in DLOC-caused crashes are far 
more likely to  be cited for drunk driving than drivers in crashes in 
general. 
Relatively few crashes (about 3%) appear to involve a conscious and 
intentional commission of DLOC. DLOC-caused crashes that are conscious 
and intentional, but not due to environmental factors (e.g., poor visiblity, 
need to avoid a bicyclist) are rarer still. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Operational definitions of three unsafe driving actions (UDAs) were 
developed using data from the l i tera ture  and accident files st HSRI .  




CHARACTERISTICS OF CRASHES CAUSED BY DLOC UDAs 
Crash Severity 











MOST FREQUENT VALUE 
RELATIVE TO VALUE FOR 
MOST FREQUENT V.4LUE CRASHES IN GENERAL 
Low to  moderate Very high 
Multiple Multiple 
Head-on Head-on; Sideswipe 
Young Young 
Male Male 
City s t ree ts  County roads; 
s t a t e  secondary roads 
Straight and level  Curve, hill, or both 
None Snow 
SOURCE: J o n e s ,  Treat,  and J o s c e l y n  1980 
'Qpe 1 - too fast, absolute 
Type 2 - too fast, relative 
Type 3 - too slow, absolute 
Type 4 - too slow, relative 
The absolute-speed UDAs (Types 1 and 3) occur when a vehicle is driven 
in excess of an appropriately established maximum speed or, in a normal 
dr iv ing environment, a t  a speed below an appropriately established 
minimum limit. Relative-speed UDL4s (Types 2 and 4)  occur when a 
vehicle's speed is so different from that of vehicles around it to create 
unacceptably high risk of a crash. Studies indicate that unacceptably high 
risk occurs a t  speeds less than the fifth percentile speed of traffic and at  
speeds greater than the ninety-fifty percentile speed. 
The following-too-closely (FTC) UDA occurs when a vehicle follows 
another vehicle at  distance such that the time separation between the two 
vehicles is so short as to create unacceptably high risk. Studies indicate 
such risk at  time separations of less than one to two seconds. 
The dr iv ing- lef t -of-center  UDAs occur when a vehicle crosses the 
center line of a two-way road when not passing or turning. 
Speed-related UDAs are by far the most prevalent of the three. We 
estimate that some 28% of all crashes nationwide are caused, a t  least in 
part, by these UDAs. More than half of these are caused by speed-too- 
fast types which are predominantly conscious and intentional. 
The FTC UDAs a re  the least prevalent of the three, appearing as a 
causal factor in only about one percent of crashes. FTC-caused crashes 
tend to be less severe than crashes as a whole. Most FTC UDAs that 
cause crashes appear to be deliberate. 
DLOC UDAs a r e  moderately prevalent, but usually are not conscious 
and intentional in the crashes they cause. Environmental  f a c t o r s  
accompany a large percentage of crashes that involve DLOC. Only a very 
small percentage of crashes (i.e,, less than one percent) would appear to 
involve DLOC UDAs that would be an appropriate target for enforcement 
counterrneasures. Thus, such counterrneasures could have, at  best, only a 
minimal effect on overall crash frequency. 
Thus, speed-too-fast and speed-too-slow U D  As should be given high 
priority by risk management agencies. Violations of statutes relating to 
FTC and DLOC should be enforced when observed, but large-scale, 
nationwide programs and large expenditures of funds for personnel and 
equipment are not indicated. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
COUNTERMEASURE ELEMENTS 
This chapter describes seven countermeasure elements that appear 
promising for reducing the incidence of the speeding unsafe driving action. 
iYe use t h e  t e r m  "e l emen tv  t o  underscore  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  these 
countermeasures would not likely be used alone in any operational program. 
Instead, they would be used as building blocks to be worked into existing 
or new programs. Chapter Five presents three such comprehensive 
programs that incorporate the elements described here. 
The countermeasure elements in this chapter fall into three groups: 
e Traffic Law System countermeasures, 
r informational countermeasures, and 
e technological countermeasures. 
Each countermeasure element within these groups is described with 
respect to  i ts  overall approach, its primary target and user groups, and 
support needed from other countermeasures. 
TRAFFIC LAW SYSTEM COUNTERMEASURES 
This group of countermeasures uses the methods and resources of the 
Traffic Law System (TLS) to reduce the incidence of speed UDAs. The 
countermeasures a re  applications of risk-management Strategy I11 as 
described in the preceding section. This strategy attempts to increase the 
disutility a driver believes will be incurred as a result of committing a 
speed UDA. The driver is thus deterred from committing a UDA, either 
as a result of being caught and punished for a prior UDA (called special 
deterrence) or as a result of the fear  of possibly being caught and 
punished for committing the UDA (called general deterrence). 
TLS countermeasures may be applied in the course of performing the 
following four functions of the system: 
Law generation: the generation of laws defining and 
prohibiting UDA and the specification of possible sanctions 
for violating these laws. 
Law enforcement: the enforcement of these laws either by 
manipulating individual behavior or by initiating formal 
system action (i.e., an arrest or citation). 
Adjudication: the determination of fact  and law in a 
par t icu lar  event involving an individual charged with 
committing the UDA. 
e Sanctioning: application of the ultimate system response 
that is intended to prevent future UDXs by the law violator 
and other potential violators. 
The TLS is often supported by a more informal fifth function, public 
information and education, whose objective is to inform drivers about the 
deterrent threat of the system. Countermeasures based on this function 
are described later in this chapter. 
Studies suggest that three factors are of primary importance to 
deterring a specified behavior (See Volume 11): 
1. the characteristics of the target population (e.g., assessment 
of risk, willingness to take risks, attitudes about authority, 
social status, impulsiveness), 
2 ,  the target population's knowledge of the presence of the 
deterrent threat, and 
3 ,  the credibili ty of the deterrent threat to the target 
population (i.e., sure and universal application of a suitably 
unpleasant punishment). 
The two TLS countermeasure elements we suggest address all of these 
factors and involve all of the four functional areas of the system. 
Specifically, the counter measures seek to: 
e increase the severity of sanctions against convicted violators 
of speed laws, and 
increase the overall enforcement of speed-law violations 
committed by selected target groups. 
Brief descriptions of these two countermeasures are presented below. 
Countermeasure Element A-1: Increase the Severity of Sanctions 
Against Convicted Violators of Speed Laws 
This countermeasure element greatly increases the severity of punitive 
sanctions imposed on speed-law violators by the TLS to enhance special 
deterrence directly and general deterrence ultimately. The target group is 
composed primarily af drivers who deliberately and repeatedly engage in 
the highest-risk, speed-related UDAs. Such UD-4s include both absolute- 
speed and relative-speed UDAs a t  the upper regions of the speed-risk 
curves. Drivers who are heavily inclined toward risk-taking for whatever 
reasons are highly overrepresented in this target group. 
Other drivers who tend not to be deterred by existing mild punishments 
for the less serious speeding law violations comprise a secondary target  
group for this countermeasure. The general deterrence effect of more 
severe sanctions is the main force for modifying the driving behavior of 
this more risk-averse group. 
The severity or ' tstrengthf7 of TLS-imposed sanctions is increased in 
several different ways. First, it increases punitive sanctions greatly in an 
attempt to swing the utility-disutility balance to favor a no-UDA decision 
by the driver. These sanctions include several-fold increases in the 
amounts of fines, more frequent and longer periods of driver license 
suspensions, and in some cases, jail sentences. Some of these punitive 
sactions also serve an incapacitative purpose in that they remove the 
opportunity fo r  commi t t i ng  t h e  UDA. The i n t e r ac t i on  of th i s  
incapacitative ef fect  with enforcement and purely punitive effects is 
synergistic in its overall effect  on repeat violations. Rehabilitative 
sanctions for treating the underlying psychological and social factors that 
contribute to some instances of problem driving behavior are also included. 
This countermeasure would also make use of other, more informal, 
sanctioning mechanisms to increase the indirect costs associated with a 
high-risk speeding UDA. These might involve, for example, rapid 
notification of the driver's insurer, followed by a sharp rise in insurance 
premiums. 
To function effectively, this countermeasure element would need to be 
supported by other elements that would help establish the credibility of the 
increased deterrent threat. First, it would have to be coupled with an 
effective enforcement component to establish a sufficiently high probability 
that high-speed drivers will  be detected and delivered to adjudication and 
sanctioning authorities. Second, it will be necessary to include a public 
information component to ensure that the target group will perceive the 
deterrent threat to be sufficient to outweigh perceived benefits of the 
unsafe driving action. Finally, this element must be compatible with all of 
the functions of the Traffic Law System, including law generation and 
adjudication as well as enforcement and sanctioning. This means that a 
viable statutory basis must be established, that the system must be able to 
absorb the increased caseload of speed-law violators, and that system 
personnel must be adequately trained and motivated to perform their tasks. 
C O U N T E R M E A S U R E  E L E M E N T  A - 2 :  I N C R E A S E  P O L I C E  
E N F O R C E M E N T  O F  S P E E D - L A W  V I O L A T I O N S  B Y  S E L E C T E D  
TARGET GROUPS 
This countermeasure uses police enforcement resources selectively 
against drivers of heavy trucks and buses that violate the 55 mph national 
naximum speed limit (NMSL) on limited access highways. It aims to 
reduce the mean speed and variance of traffic in general by reducing the 
speed of heavy trucks and buses that often act as pacesetters on these 
highways. Other vehicles traveling over 55 mph on these highways are a 
secondary target group. 
Police agencies that enforce speeding laws on limited access highways 
are the user group of this countermeasure. Such agencies most often will 
be state-level agencies and will be supported by other TLS components and 
information and education elements. 
Classic selective enforcement techniques are used for identifying target 
segments of highway. The countermeasure employs enforcement procedures 
suggested by research to be most effective for controlling speeding 
violations (see Joscelyn and Jones 198 0). 
Identification of high-violation locations is made through mobile sensor 
systems. Visual observations by police-patrol officers, ci tizensl complaints, 
and accident reports provide supplementary target-identification data or 
may be primary data sources where sensor systems are  not available. 
Exact locations of enforcement vehicles are varied periodically to create 
the impression of a higher intensity of enforcement than actually exists. 
An optimal rat io of patrol presence to patrol absence at  a site is used 
over the period of selective enforcement activity. 
Patrol vehicles assigned to the target area are predominantly marked 
cars and/or motorcycles and are parked conspicuously along the highway in 
a high-threat configuration (e.g., flashing light, issuing a citation). Radar 
is used for detection and speed measurement where s ta tu tes  permit. 
Wr i t t en  warnings or ci tat ions a re  given to apprehended violators. 
Unconventional enforcement vehicles (e.g., large trucks) a re  used to  
augment the visible symbols to create an impression that any vehicle could 
be a police vehicle. 
Like Countermeasure Element -4-1, this countermeasure must be 
carefully integrated into existing Traffic Law System operations in s 
jurisdiction. Support by an effective public information countermeasure is 
probably even more important than it is for element A-I. 
INFORMATIONAL COUNTERMEASURES 
This group contains two separate classes of countermeasure elements. 
The f irst  class, called d i r e c t  information countermeasures, provides 
information about the possible consequences of a speed-rela ted U D-4 t 0 
drivers to influence them to decide not to commit the UDA. '4 second 
class of indirect information countermeasures provides information to 
others for use in influencing driver decisions about UDAs. 
The direct counterneasure element described here (Countermeasure 
element B-1) employs strategy I (decrease the utility of committing the 
UDA), strategy I1 (increase the utility of not committing the UDA), and 
s t ra tegy I11 (increase the disutility of committing the UDA). I t  wi l l  be 
seen that information countermeasures employing s t ra tegy IV a re  also 
possible but have less general  applicability to a broad range of 
jurisdictions. Both the direct and the indirect countermeasures in this 
section are described in general programmatic terms with illustrative 
examples of specific applications. Educational and training applications are 
treated within the indirect category (countermeasure element B-2). 
Principles stated in Volume I1 of this report are used in identifying 
target groups, developing message content, and identifying media and 
com munications channels. These principles suggest that: 
informational countermeasures should be aimed at specific 
target groups with specific decision problems; 
e groups who tend to make decisions to model the behavior of 
others should be given credible models of behavior to 
follow; 
groups who tend to weigh the advantages and disadvantages 
of a behavior should be given information on the outcomes 
of a UDA decision; 
r the  uses of the vehicles by a t a r g e t  groups ( e .9 ,  
transportation vs. recreation) should be considered in 
designing informational elements; 
information should stress the immediate consequences of a 
U D A  or  non-UDA decision r a the r  than long-term 
consequences or the probability of an outcome; 
informat ional  elements should attempt to utilize the 
informal influence of groups in addition to the more formal 
influences of institutions (e.g., the legal system) ; and 
messages used in supporting legal-system strategies should 
stress the legitimacy of the law as well as the negative 
effects of legal sanctions. 
C O U N T E R M E A S U R E  ELEMENT B-1: PROVIDE INFORMATION TO 
DRIVERS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF SPEED-RELATED UDAS 
This countermeasure provides information to show that committing a 
speed-related UDA does not significantly reduce travel time and has a high 
potential cost, while complying with speed laws reduces the cost of 
operating a motor vehicle. Media for these messages include radio, 
billboards, and other media that reach drivers while they are driving (i.e., 
provide ?'im m ediacyw). 
The target group for this countermeasure is drivers who exceed posted 
speed limits on limited access and secondary roads. Possible subgroups of 
drivers include: 
young drivers, 
o old drivers, 
drivers of certain classes of vehicles (e.g., heavy trucks, 
buses), and 
commuters. 
A va r i e ty  of user groups is possible, depending on the specific 
informational content and media that are chosen, Likely initiators of the 
countermeasure a re  s ta te  and local highway safety agencies and groups; 
s t a t e  highway departments and local road commissions; and public 
information and education (PI&E) groups within large police departments. 
User groups could include some of these same agencies plus private sector 
organizations, for example, fleet owners, trade associations, unions, etc. 
Three major types of appeals are used: 
1. noncompliant behavior does not appreciably reduce travel 
time in many instances (strategy I), 
2 .  compliant behavior reduces the cost of operating a motor 
vehicle (strategy II), and 
3 .  the potential cost of noncompliant behavior is very high 
(strategy 111). 
-4ppeal 1. This presents information on travel time in various driving 
situations (e.g., type of highway, traffic volume, weather, t r ip  length). 
The information shows that the amount of time saved by committing the 
UDA is small, both in an absolute sense and relative to the time lost due 
to an enforcement action or a traffic crash. 
Appeal 2. This presents vehicle operating cost data as a function of 
speed and miles driven per year. The information is presented in a form 
that is relevant to the target group(s) and their driving habits. It shows 
that substantial reductions in economic costs can be achieved by observing 
speed limits. A variant of appeal 2 stresses other types of cost savings 
realized through compliant behavior. These noneconomic costs include loss 
of energy independence (including national pride) and the effects of energy 
wasted on high-speed driving on compliant drivers and various aspects of 
everyday life (e.g., employment, keeping warm, inflation). 
Appeal 3 presents information on the potential costs of noncompliant 
behavior, with emphasis on economic and other costs resulting from 
enforcement actions or crashes or both. For example, the various 
components of such costs would be listed and tallied in a presentation, 
viz,: 
time lost from work: $xxx 
medical costs not covered by insurance: $xxx 
nondeductible auto repair costs: $xxx 
increase in auto insurance premiums: $xxx 
e fine for law violation: $xxx 
Total: $xxx 
The three types of appeals could be used separately or in combination. 
Models of appropriate behavior as well as more "rational" justifications are 
provided. 
The most appropriate media for this countermeasure element would be 
those that are accessible to the driver while driving. These would include: 
radio (AM, FM, CB), 
billboards, 
roadside signs, 
a dashboard s t i cke r s  and bumper s t ickers  (for simple 
messages), and 
e on-board microcomputers with displays. 
Research indicates that changes in driver behavior are not likely to 
r e su l t  f rom P I & E  campaigns unless they a re  combined with other 
countermeasure elements. Apparently, some kind of action component is 
needed to back up the threats and rewards that are proclaimed in the 
informational programs. Thus, to make appeal 3 more effective, elements 
that would make the cost components credible to a driver would have to 
be added. For example, one could increase the probability of detection of 
the UDA by increasing enforcement (element A-2). This would provide 
backup for the advertised cost of driving too fast. Other countermeasure 
elements could be incorporated to back up other appeals. 
COUNTERMEASURE B-2: PROVIDE INFORMATION TO OTHERS TO 
I N F L U E N C E  DRIVER D E C I S I O N S  A B O U T  COMMITTING S P E E D -  
RELATED U D A s  
This countermeasure uses messages on car bumpers, billboards, radio, 
etc,, to inform drivers where and how to report speed-law violations. The 
reports are then used by private groups and organizations as a basis for 
punishments for noncompliances with the laws o r  fo r  rewards  fo r  
compliance. Also, information on the risk of speed UDAs and information 
on how best to manage that risk may be provided to  TLS s taf f .  The 
countermeasure augments limited police resources in detecting speed-law 
violators and provides information for improving the operation of the TLS 
in dealing with such violators. 
This countermeasure element addresses two distinct target groups: 
0 Group 1: other drivers in the traffic stream who observe 
speed-law violations, and 
Group 2: Traffic Law System personnel who operate 
deterrence countermeasures. 
Drivers in group 1 are conforming to the speed laws when they observe 
the violations of other drivers. Group 1 drivers may be driving any type 
of vehicle under any type of traffic condition. Group 2 includes police 
officers, prosecutors, traffic court judges, and driver licensing personnel. 
Both of these groups are  intermediate target groups. The ultimate 
target group is drivers who exceed maximum speed limits, especially those 
who exceed speed limits by a large amount. 
Initiators and operators of the countermeasure element directed at 
target group 1 include citizen groups, automobile associations (e.g., AAA), 
highway safety agencies (e.g., agencies that administer a state's 402 
program), employers, schools/colleges, unions, and Traffic Law Systems 
agencies (e.g., a police department). Initiators and operators of the 
element directed at  target group 2 are primarily highway safety agencies 
and TLS agencies, 
Two modes of operation are envisaged, In mode 1, information is 
provided to drivers to enable them to report speeding law violations to a 
central location. The information appears in different forms depending on 
the media used for the messages, for example: 
0 bumper stickers and dashboard stickers: a terse statement 
informing drivers of the phone numbers and/or CB channels 
that should be contacted to report violations, 
billboards: longer messages giving information to motivate 
contacts, and 
radio: a talk show explaining the driver reporting program 
and its rationale. 
Various alternatives are available for using the motoristsf reports of 
speeding violations. For example, violations could be reported to the state 
driver licensing authority, which could require the driver or vehicle owner 
to appear for an interview or hearing. Violations could also be reported to 
private groups and organizations (e,g., parent's organizations, automobile 
clubs, and fraternal groups). Reporting of violations to TLS agencies for 
subsequent prosecution is not recommended because of other requirements 
that must be met to use the reports in obtaining convictions (e.g., 
necessity to obtain an arrest warrant, the possibility that the reporting 
driver might have to testify in court, etc.). 
Mode 2 of this countermeasure provides information to TLS agencies to 
support their law generation, enforcement, adjudication, and sanctioning 
activities relative to speed-too-fast UDAs. Such information would define 
the risk associated with these UDAs and would describe the programs 
(planned or currently operating) to deal with that risk. The information 
would be provided through training and educational programs for 
interfunctional groups of TLS personnel (e.g,, fo r  police o f f i c e r s ,  
legislators, or judges) or for intrafunctional groups. The small group 
seminars for police, legislators, prosecutors, judges, etc., given to support 
the  Alcohol S a f e t y  Act ion P r o j e c t s  (ASAPs) a r e  an example of 
interfunctional programs, and the NHTSA-sponsored seminars i n  Traff ic  
Case Adjudication Systems are an example of interfunctional programs. 
Again, this countermeasure element wi l l  require the support of other 
countermeasure elements to achieve its intended effects. In the case of 
citizen reporting of violations (mode I), it will be necessary to establish 
that the reports are actually used so that the reporting motorist will not 
regard the effort taken to make the report as wasted. Mode 2 ,  which 
calls for  disseminating information to TLS personnel, obviously requires 
that a user jurisdiction have an integrated TLS program against the speed- 
too-fast UDA, which in turn implies a need for TLS countermeasure 
elements, that is, more severe sanctions (A-I), and increased enforcement 
activity (A-2). 
TECHNOLOGICAL COUNTERMEASURES 
Countermeasure elements based on the use of modern technology are in  
this group. In general, such countermeasures grow out of a need to 
improve ex i s t ing  approaches  ( fo r  example ,  T r a f f i c  L a w  System 
countermeasures) or are completely new approaches suggested by the new 
technology itself. 
Both of these two types of counterneasures are represented in the 
concepts described in this section. The countermeasure dements are: 
an automatic detection device for detecting speed-law 
violators, 
e an operating speed recorder, and 
a device for warning drivers and passengers when the 
drivers are committing speed-law violations 
C O U N T E R M E A S U R E  E L E M E N T  C-1: A U T O M A T E D  D E T E C T I O N  
DEVICE 
In this countermeasure, automated detection devices are  used to 
identify and detect violators of the 55 mph NMSL and other speed laws. 
Information on a violation is provided to TLS and non-TLS organizations 
for use in sanctioning violators. The countermeasure increases both the 
perceived and actual probability of detection without increasing police 
patrol activity. 
The primary target group is drivers who violate the 55 mph national 
maximum speed limit (NMSL) on limited access highways. Secondary 
target groups include violators of maximum speed limits on other types of 
roads, dr ivers  who exceed maximuin s a f e  speeds under ce r t a in  
environmental conditions, and individuals who drive less than the minimum 
posted speed limit on selected segments of highways, 
Law enforcement  agencies  are the primary user group of this 
countermeasure element. Such agencies include police departments and 
highway patrols at the municipal, county, and state levels, depending on 
the location of the target segment of highway. Secondary user groups are 
driver licensing agencies and other TLS and non-TLS agencies. 
Automated devices are used to detect violators of speeding laws. The 
hardware for detecting and identifying violators is of the type developed 
by the Boeing Corporation for the ORBIS 111 tested in the United States 
and the Multanova system being used in Germany (Glauz and Blackburn 
1980). 
The detection device consists of a speed sensor and a camera. Vehicle 
speeds are measured by the speed sensor. Vehicles traveling a t  preset 
speed ranges (e.g., greater than 60 mph) are automatically photographed by 
the camera. The photographs show the vehicle registration number, vehicle 
speed, and the time, date, and location of the violations. Some versions 
of this device also photograph the driver to aid in identification. 
The photographs are collected periodically from the cameras and the 
data  used for a series of possible subsequent actions, depending on the 
particular operational mode chosen. Such actions could include:. 
o warning letters to the vehicle owners; 
citation and subsequent prosecution of violators; 
e advisory l e t t e r s  to  employers of the drivers when the 
vehicles were provided by the employer; 
r, advisory letters to others as appropriate (e.g., parents, car 
rental agencies, insurance companies); and 
e lists of the owners of speeding vehicles presented in the 
news media (e.g., newspapers, radio, television). 
Dissemination and use of the data would, in general, involve other TLS 
agencies (e.g., driver license administrators) and could involve agencies and 
organizations outside of the TLS. 
Clearly, this countermeasure element must function as a part of a total 
program that would not only detect speed-law violators, but would take 
also action to deal with those violators. Smooth integration into existing 
Traffic Law System operations would be essential. The effect  of this 
countermeasure on the incidence of speeed-too-fast VDAs would be 
expec t ed  t o  be enhanced  by combining i t  wi th  i n f o r m a t i o n a l  
countermeasure elements, for example, B-1. 
C O U N T E R M E A S U R E  E L E M E N T  C - 2 :  O P E R A T I N G  S P E E D  
RECORDER 
The operating speed recorder (OSR) provides speed-time or speed- 
distance histories of a t r ip  to  owners of vehicles that  a re  used by 
employees or dependent children. The information is used for negative 
measures to discourage speed-law violations (e.g., reprimands, reduction of 
bonuses) or for  positive measures to encourage compliance (e.g., awards, 
increased vacation). The OSR helps reduce the number of police officers 
required to  detect  and report a given number of violations and also 
eliminates the need for subsequent action by other TLS elements, 
This countermeasure element is directed primarily at  two types of 
target groups: 
e Target Group 1: individuals who violate speed laws while 
driving c e r t a i n  types of  commercial ly-owned and 
government-owned vehicles, including autos, trucks, and 
buses. 
Target Group 2: dependent children who violate speed 
laws while driving their parent's vehicles. 
The user group for countermeasures in target group 1 are the companies 
and agencies that own the vehicles that are being driven in violation of 
speed laws. The companies include owners of fleets of vehicles used by 
company personnel and owners of fleets of vehicles that may be rented or 
leased to private citizens or to other companies. Governmental agencies 
include those at the federal, state, and local levels. 
The user group for target group 2 countermeasures are the parents who 
own the vehicles that their children drive at illegally high speeds. 
In this countermeasure, speed-time information is fed to a computer- 
recorder unit, that is, the operating speed recorder, (OSR), which provides 
speed-time and/or speed-distance histories of a given trip or series of 
trips. More advanced versions could use the speed-time data to calculate 
and record acceleration histories as well. The OSR device is a inodern 
electronic version of earlier, mechanical devices (e.g., the Tachograph) that 
provided similar information. 
The speed records are provided to the OSR user as a basis for either 
positive measures to encourage speed-law compliance or negative measures 
to discourage noncompliance. Negative measures for target group 1 drivers 
could include verbal and written reprimands, fines, reduction of bonuses, 
reduction in share of profits (in companies with profit sharing plans), and 
even dismissal for chronic speed-law violators. Vehicle leasing and rental 
agencies could charge higher rates based on some function of speed in 
excess of the speed limit and amount of time spent driving over the speed 
limit. Tax disincentives might be applied to companies with histories of 
excessive violations of speed laws, Insurance rates might also be increased 
for such companies. Positive measures for target group 1 could mirror the 
negative measures, for example, praise, awards, financial rewards, increased 
vacation time, and lower vehicle rental rates for compliant drivers; and 
tax incentives for exemplary companies. Companies and governmental 
agencies could use the data from the OSR to establish more realistic 
schedules so that drivers would not be forced to violate speed laws to 
meet the schedules. 
For target group 2, parents could allocate their children's use of their 
vehicle on the basis of speed-law compliance. Other rewards and 
punishments also could be tied to compliance. 
The data from the OSR might be displayed to the driver to show when 
negative or positive ffpointstt were being tallied. The current net value of 
rewards or punishments might be presented in such a display. 
As with other countermeasure elements that detect speed-law violations 
(and as suggested above), the OSR should be complemented with elements 
that take action against the detected violators. This strengthens the 
special risk-management dimension of the detection mechanism which in 
turn strengthens general risk-management, The actions may be taken by 
formal, governmental risk-management systems such as the Traffic Law 
Systems (implying additional countermeasure elements from group -4) or by 
systems outside of government (e.g., insurance companies,  pr ivate  
employers). Applications of the OSR would be further enhanced by 
providing information to drivers on the consequences of speeding and the 
role of the device in lessening the utility of speeding to the driver. 
COUNTERMEASURE ELEMENT C-3: ON-BOARD S P E E D  WARNING 
SYSTEM (OSWS) 
This device provides a visual and/or an audible warning signal to drivers 
and passengers when a vehicle's speed exceeds a preset value, Drivers of 
commercial vehicles or rental vehicles are the primary target group. The 
OSWS could be placed on all vehicles (most  probably a t  t ime of 
manufacture) or on special groups of vehicles (e.g., buses, taxis, privately- 
owned automobiles, rental automobiles) by the owners. 
The OSWS is a device that provides an audi5le warnings, a visual 
~~arning ,  or both to a driver when his speed exceeds a preset value. Many 
different versions of the device may be conceived. For example, the 
warning threshold could be set at  55 mph, and the warning signal could 
increase (or decrease) in intensity or frequency as the amount of the speed 
violation increased. One very simple configuration (described by Richard 
Olson of Pennsylvania State University in a le t ter  to Terry Jackson of 
NHTSA) would emit a clicking sound when a car exceeded 55 mph, with 
the clicks becoming more frequent but less loud as the speed increased 
above 55 mph. 
More sophisticated versions tied into the operating speed recorder and 
displays of the type described earlier in this chapter are also possible. 
Further, the device could be a part of an integrated warning system that 
would provide warning signals to other drivers when a vehicle's speed 
reached a very high leve l  (e.g., 2 0  mph over the speed limit). 
Informational countermeasure elements would also enhance the ef f e zts of 
this device. 
SUMMARY 
Three broad classes of countermeasure elements offer promise for 
reducing the incidence of speed-too-fast unsafe driving actions. They are: 
Traffic Law System Countermeasures, 
Information Countermeasures, and 
Technological Countermeasures. 
Traffic Law System countermeasures attempt to reduce the incidence of 
speed-too-f ast U D  As by generating and enforcing laws prohibiting such 
behavior, by adjudicating cases against accused violators, and by imposing 
sanctions against drivers found guilty of a violation. Theory holds that 
successful accomplishment of all these functions will deter many drivers 
from committing the UDA. 
The two TLS countermeasure elements described in this chapter are 
aimed a t  increasing the magnitude of the TLS deterrent threat b y  
increasing the severity of TLS sanctions against speed-law violators 
(element A-1) and by increasing the overall enforcement of speed-law 
viola t ions  by heavy t r ucks  and buses ( e l e m e n t  -1-2). The f irst  
countermeasure is responsive to the need to back up police enforcement 
activity to create a credible ultimate threat that will achieve a favorable 
balance in a driver's utility-disutility equation. The second countermeasure 
addresses the need to achieve leverage in TLS activity, It does so by 
aiming at  a small target group that influences the driving behavior of a 
much larger group, 
Driver decisions about UDAs a re  influenced Sy information on the 
possible outcomes of speed UDAs, and risk-management system response to 
the speed-UDA problem requires information about the problern and how to 
deal with it. The two informational countermeasure elements described in 
this section address both of these fundamental needs. Countermeasure 
element 5-1 informs individual drivers about specific losses that stern from 
UDAs and spec i f i c  gains a t t a i n a b l e  by not  commi t t i ng  UD-4s. 
Countermeasure element 8-2 advises other drivers i n  the t raf f ic  stream 
about  what actions to take against an observed UDA and provides 
information about UDX risk and risk responses to TLS agencies. 
Modern technology provides another means of gaining leverage in 
dealing with speed UDAs. Three such technological countermeasures have 
been identified. The automated detection device and the operating speed 
recorder (countermeasure elements C-1 and C-2, respectively) perform the 
usually labor-intensive detection function without the need for police patrol 
forces and then provide the information to agencies that can apply control 
forces more economically than can the TLS. Further, the automaiic 
detection device also provides a general deterrence threat without the need 
for police presence. The on-board speed warning system (countermeasure 
element C-3) also provides for low-cost detection of UDAs and for the use 
of punishments (and rewards) by non-TLS agencies. 
The word 7felement'1 is used deliberately in conjunction with all of these 
countermeasure concepts. They a re  intended to be incorporated into 
existing or new countermeasure programs to interact smoothly with existing 
components. Three promising such total  programs, each incorporating 




Examination of the countermeasure elements described in the preceding 
chapter will reveal that they all rely on one or more of the following 




Detection elements determine when a UDL4 has been committed and 
identify the of fending driver or vehicle. Information about the existence 
of the UDA is then provided to the driver and risk-management systems 
who take action to interrupt the UDA or to prevent its future occurrence. 
Information about the likelihood and nature of various outcomes of UDXs 
also is provided to drivers to influence them not to commit a UDA in the 
f irst  place and t o  risk management systems to improve their operation. 
Al l  of these mechanisms attempt to influence the utilities and disutilities s 
driver associates with a UDA so that a favorable decision will be made, 
i.e., a decision not to commit the UDA or a decision to adopt behavior 
patterns that will preclude the opportunity or need to commit the UDA. 
A comprehensive countermeasure program against a UDA (in this case 
speeding) should incorporate elements that use all of these mechanisms, In 
this chapter we identify three such countermeasure programs that appear 
to have promise for a broad range of state and local jurisdictions. Factors 
that could affect the adoption, operation, and impact of each program are 
discussed. Considerations important to the test and evaluation of the 
three programs are treated in Chapter Sir. 
We emphasize that we do not represent the programs we have chosen 
for discussion in this chapter as voptirnal" or ''top priority'' in  any glob81 
sense. Selection and tailoring of countermeasure programs will always 
remain a local problem. The programs presented here are top-level 
descriptions of what might be implemented in some jurisdictions. Further 
detailed design, test, and evaluation efforts would be required prior to any 
such implementation of these programs or variations of them. '41~0, in 
presenting these three programs we do not imply that other combinations 
of countermeasure elements should not be considered. On the contrary, 
some jurisdictions may find these three programs inappropriate to their 
needs or conditions and may find other programs more desirable. The 
material presented in this chapter is intended to assist jurisdictions in 
constructing programs suitable to their unique needs. 
P R O G R A M  1 - - I N C R E A S E D  E N F O R C E M E N T  A N D  P U N I T I V E  
SANCTIONS 
Description 
The target group of this program consists of drivers of heavy trucks 
and busses operating at high-risk speeds on limited access highways. In 
this case, the term "high risk" is defined as a relative-speed U D A  
occurring when the vehicle's speed is greater than the 95th percentile 
speed of traffic or an absolutespeed UDA occurring when the vehicle's 
speed is more than 10 miles per hour greater than the posted limit. The 
program combines increased police enforcement (element A-2) with more 
severe Traffic-Law-System (TLS) sanctions (element A-1). Three different 
informational elements are included: 
e information to the target group on the consequences of 
speeding (element B-1); 
information to other drivers on where to report speed-law 
violations (element B-2, mode 1); and 
o information to TLS personnel and others on the nature of 
the need for the program (element B-2, mode 2). 
g e t  ection is accomplished primarily by state-level police-enforcement 
units. Selective enforcement procedures are used in determining where and 
 hen to deploy patrol units (see Joscelyn and Jones 1980 for a discussion 
of recommended enforcement procedures against speed-related UDAS), The 
units are allocated as a function of the traffic crash risk that occurs at  
different times and places in a jurisdiction. Risk is measured by the 
number and severity of crashes caused by the speeding UDA as well as the 
incidence of the UDA. >lobile sensor systems supplemented by police- 
officer observations and citizen reports are the main sources of data on 
risk. 
The sensor systems use induction loops or road tubes placed on the 
highway to provide signals to processing and recording units which compute 
and s t o r e  speed  distr ibutions and vehicle types, These units are  
commercially available from several manufacturers (for example, St reeter  
.4metfs T ~ ~ ~ ~ C O M P Q  ) and are being used operationally. 
A citizens' reporting system provides information for risk-identification 
as well as information for detection (discussed later). Messages telling 
how to report violations are placed on trucks and busses from cooperating 
organizations and on car bumpers. Public service spot announcements on 
radio and TV and notices in newspapers also provide information about the 
program and where to report violations, The main reporting channel is a 
toll-free telephone number monitored by the s t  a t e  police agency ,  
Iieporting motorists a re  asked to identify the violating vehicle and the 
nature, time, place, and other circumstances of the violation. This 
information is then stored in a computer for later processing and analysis. 
Data from other sources (including the mobile sensor system and accident 
reports) are also input into the computer. 
Radar speed measuring equipment is *used by the police to detect the 
speeding trucks and buses where laws and practices of governmental 
agencies permit, Stationary radar is used for primary detection in a team 
configuration involving separate parked patrol cars for detection and 
apprehension. Aircraft with stopwatches are used for detecting speeding 
vehicles when there are large areas to cover. The aircraft work as a part 
of a detection-apprehension team with patrol cars doing the apprehending. 
Overt procedures a re  used primarily in detection operations. Yighly 
visible, conspicuously placed patrol cars are used to advertise the threat. 
The cars have light bars and are distinctively colored and marked. Covert 
procedures are also used where statutes permit and may involve the use of 
unconventional vehicles (e.g., heavy trucks), The Maryland State 
Police Bus and Truck Patrol (BAT) is an example of the effective use of 
such covert techniques (see Clark 1978). 
Apprehended drivers are required to appear in court where they are 
charged with violating the "high-risk speedingTf law. A first conviction 
results in a fine of $500 by the court. Court costs of $50 are added and 
are placed in a special fund to support the informational and citizen- 
reporting element of the program, 
Employers of the drivers and involved insurance carriers are notified of 
the convictions. Citizen reports of alleged violations in which the drivers 
were not detected and apprehended by police units are provided to 
employers without comment. Such reports are not used in the court 
proceedings unless a formal complaint is filed by the citizen reporting the 
violation. The names of carriers with high rates of violations (both 
convictions and citizen reports) are provided to the media. 
An informational element on the consequences of speeding to the target 
group and their employers is included in this program. All three types of 
appeals described under Countermeasure Element B-2 of Chapter Four are 
used. Appeal 1 emphasizes the impact of a police stop on travel time. 
Appeal 2 emphasizes the costs savings to the driver and the employer that 
can be realized through compliant behavior. Appeal 3 stresses the 
potential cost to drivers and employers of the enforcement and sanctioning 
activity. Appropriate media are  used for the appeals, including those 
listed in Chapter Four. In addition, informational packets are disseminated 
to employers, unions, truck stops, etc. 
A separate informational element is established to prepare Traffic Law 
Systems (TLS) staff for the program. Descriptive materials identifying the 
problem and outlining the material of the program and the rationale behind 
it are sent to key system actors (e.g., police administrators, prosecutors, 
judges). Individual police officers are introduced to the program through 
their ongoing training and education activity. Interdisciplinary, small-group 
seminars are held to facilitate the interaction of the various organizational 
e l e m e n t s  and s t akeho lde r s  that  will be affected by the program. 
Participants include management staff from trucking companies, t ransi t  
authorities, and unions, as well as influential individuals from TLS agencies 
(e.g., the state police, the state DMV,  the state judges association). 
Key Feasibility and Effectiveness Issues 
Detection Elements. This countermeasure program first requires the 
establishment of a credible probability of detection of the UDA among the 
target group. This in turn requires that  sufficient numbers of patrol 
vehicles be assigned to the selective enforcement campaign to create a 
threat on the selected segments of roadway. Further, this must be done 
without adversely affecting other enforcement activities. 
This problem can be somewhat alleviated by using optimal scheduling 
techniques for the patrols to achieve the maximum carryover effect of 
police presence (Brackett and Edwards 1977). This technique, along with 
informational countermeasure elements, will increase a driver's perception 
of enforcement intensity at  a constant level of ac tual  intensity and thus 
reduce the additional number of patrol units required for a given effect. 
Thus, resource availability and ultimately cost factors will limi t the 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of th i s  countermeasure. In some jurisdictions such 
considerations also may affect the feasibility of the program. In such 
cases more llausterell detection systems may have to be employed (e.g., 
elinination of mobile sensor systems for risk identification), 
Actions taken to  circumvent detection will be an added problem 
because of the wide experience and ~ s a v v y n  of this target  group i n  
responding to enforcement countermeasures. Such actions may be expected 
to include the use of radar detectors and CB radios. :vlore indirect actions 
such as the use of political and economic pressures by trucking companies, 
trade associations, and unions, are also possible in some applications. 
Informational Elements. Several factors are critical to the success 
of the information elements of this countermeasure program. Most of 
these factors affect any informational !lcampaign." These include designing 
the specific messages, determining where and when to use them, operating 
and maintaining the information displays, evaluation, and financing. 
Important precursor activities are testing and marketing the informational 
elements. 
Problems can also be expected in the area of system integration. 
Interfacing this element with other elements to obtain a more-or-less 
systems approach greatly increases the complexity of the total program 
and requires a strong program management component. Coordination 
among the various organizations involved in this program is the key factor 
in building an integrated program. 
The citizen reporting element presents unique problems of its own, 
including: 
having  e f f e c t i v e  m e c h a n i s m s  f o r  ! l se l l ingl l  t h e  
countermeasure to potential user groups; 
providing su i tab le  materials,  methods, and technical 
assistance to user groups for designing and implementing 
local programs; and 
developing acceptable ways of handling driver reports to 
have the greatest positive effect on the driving behavior of 
reported violators and to avoid excessive negative reactions 
and "backlashf1 effects. 
This last factor is particularly critical, but is somewhat alleviated in this 
application by not using the citizen reports for formal legal-system action 
against the drivers. Hevertheless, the possibility exists that the reporting 
system could be abused, both by reporters (e.g., as a mechanism for 
revenge against s particular driver or firm), and by users of the reports 
(e.g., unjustified or excessively harsh punishments against drivers). 
The success of the training and education element hinges on: 
making the training program available to s ta te  and local 
agencies and ensuring that they understand its objectives, 
methods, and importance; 
having effective materials and ffinstructorsu for the training 
programs; and 
e ensuring that key personnel attend the program, 
Development of training packages by NHTSA that  could be tziilored by 
state and local agencies to meet their needs could improve the chances of 
success of this element. 
Action Elements. Two categories of actions will be taken against the 
speed-law violators: formal sanctions applied through TLS agents, and 
informal rewards and punishments provided by private, nongoverninental 
organizations. The feasibility and effectiveness of the formally applied 
sanction will depend on the ability of a jurisdiction to establish a suitable 
statutory basis for the nerv sanctioning program and then to  persuade 
adjudicators and sanctioning authorities to participate in the program, 
Acceptance of the countermeasure by the public and special interest groups 
will be essential to  obtaining the necessary changes to statutes and 
administrative regulations. 
Experience indicates that prosecutors often do not prosecute for traffic 
offenses that have harsh sanctions and that judges often do not impose 
such sanctions even when they have the power to do so. These tendencies 
usually stem from a lack of understanding of the risk created by the 
accused violator, misconceptions about the effects of the sanctions on the 
violator, and a tendency to identify with the violator. The training and 
educstion element is designed to  overcome these tendencies and is 
therefore critical to the success of the increased-sanctions element. 
Past experience with legislative and judicial countermeasures in the 
area of alcohol and highway safety shows the importance of careful and 
s y s t e m a t i c  planning prior to  implementation. A se t  of operating 
procedures must be developed and fully coordinated with all TLS elemenis 
and interfacing organizations. The procedures (and other aspects of the 
system design) must account for the impact of the countermeasure on all 
ele ments of this sys tem, for example, increased caseload and increasing 
processing time per case. The need for additional personnel or additional 
capability of existing personnel could be an important factor. 
The informal-actions component presents a different set of feasibility 
and effectiveness issues. Most important among these  is gaining 
cooper ation by key organizations, for example, fleet operators and 
insurance companies. Extensive contact and interaction with these groups 
will be required. Another issue is the identification of suitable rewards 
and punishments, that is, rewards that a r e  not too generous and 
punishments that are not too harsh. Clearly some experimentation will be 
required to determine optimal informal actions, and this factor should be 
built into the program. 
PROGRAM 2--AUTOMATIC DETECTION DEVICES WITH CIVIL-LAW 
SANCTIONS 
Description 
This countermeasure program uses an automatic detection device to 
detect speeders (greater than 5 mph over the limit) on expressways that 
operate through and around a large city (countermeasure element C-1). 
This program incorporates an ongoing public information component 
(element 73-1) that describes the program and the consequences of speeding. 
The automated detection devices scans license plates of speeders and 
records information on the plates along with the speed, time, and location 
of the violation. Data on traffic flow (e.g., mean speed, speed standard 
deviation, ra te  of flow) at  the time of the violation also are recorded. 
The instruments are placed within stanchions, some of which are "decoysff 
and contain no instruments. An optimal ratio of decoy units to live units 
is maintained. The instruments are assigned to stanchions on a random 
3asis and are changed a t  random times so that s maximum overall 
detection threat is maintained. 
The automated detection devices units are monitored by individuals who 
are not sworn police officers and who do not require extensive training. 
The retrieved records are used as a basis for civil law action against the 
vehicle owners. The registered owner of a vehicle found to have violated 
a posted limit would be penalized $100 after being identified through a 
central record system (see Ruschmann, Greyson, and Joscelyn 1979). The 
penalty would have to be paid before the vehicle owner could re-register 
the vehicle or have the title transferred. If the civil penalty were not 
paid, a civil process would be used to seize and sell the vehicle, 
The accompanying police information campaign would prepare the public 
for the new detection-action systems and would help  main ta in  an 
acceptable level of awareness during steady-state operation. A11 three 
types of appeals described in Chapter Four would be used, but Appeal 3 
( that  the potential cost of speeding is very high) would be stressed. 
Roadway signs would warn motorists of the presence of the ADDS (a large 
fraction of which are decoys) and the penalties for law violation. Running 
tabulations of the outcomes of the civil actions would be presented in the 
mass media with impoundment actions emphasized in the media. 
Key Feasibility and Effectiveness Issues 
Detection Elements. The effectiveness and efficiency of this 
countermesure is dependent upon a number of operational factors. First, 
the devices must be installed at  locations where speed violations are a 
problem and in sufficient numbers to provide a deterrent ef fect  over a 
significant total length of highway. This could require a large number of 
installations in jurisdictions with many miles of applicable roadway. This 
requirement is reduced in this application by having dummy installations at 
most locations and shifting the d e t e c t i o n  un i t s  among loca t ions .  
Nevertheless, the initial investment in  equipment can be high. 
Maintenance and replacement can be another significant category of 
operating costs unless system reliability and maintainability are high. A 
careful analysis of system failure and repair rates and associated costs is 
needed as an input to determining the system's feasibility in  specific 
operating environments. Operating experience thus far  indicstes a 
relatively high level of system avsilability (Glauz and Blackburn 1980). 
Maintainillg speed measuring accuracy is another factor related to the 
reliability/maintainability problem. 
Data col lect ion from the devices could be time consuming in 
applications with a large number of installations. Replenishment and 
routine checkout and calibration would occur during stops t3 gather data 
packages, Processing the paperwork flowing from these data could also 
require considerable resources. 
-4ctions by external agents could neutralize the devices in some 
applications, Such actions range from vandalism to tampering with sensors 
and cameras (e,g., covering lenses or making them opaque) to possible 
jamming equipment installations in vehicles to prevent accurate operation 
of sensors and cameras. CB transmissions could alert drivers to sections 
of the highway with nonfunctioning units, Again, lirni ted operating 
experience has not found this problem to be significant. 
-4 range of human, public, and political factors will be critical to 
the success of this countermeasure. These include the willingness of the 
public to accept what could be perceived as a big-brother-like monitoring 
of their behavior, the willingness and ability of public and private agencies 
to use the information to gain compliance with speed laws, and most 
important, the effectiveness of the information in gaining compliance. 
-4h0, user groups will have to be alert to possible adverse side-effects 
growing out of some uses of the information provided by the system, for 
example, "contestsyt between members of some high-risk groups to see who 
is mentioned most often in the news media as a violator. 
Several legal factors are relevant to the feasibility of using automated 
detection devices. These include: 
1. establishing the scientific reliability and proper working 
order of the device; 
2 .  statutory prohibitions, as "speed traps," of time-distance 
measurements; 
3 .  self-incrimination problems involved in compelling a vehicle 
owner to appear in court, testify, and possibly identify 
oneself as the offending driver; and 
4 .  due-process problems involved in sanctioning a vehicle 
owner for violations committed by other persons using the 
vehicle. 
A detailed discussion of these constraints appears in: Xuschmann, P.A.; 
Greyson, M.; and Joscelyn, K.B. 1979. An analysis of potential legal 
constraints on the use of speed measuring devices. Publication by the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration report no DOT-HS-805-524. 
The discussion indicates that, with respect to scientific validity, radar 
principles have received "judicial notice" or scientific acceptance by almost 
every court,  and automatic time-distance measuring devices (e.g., those 
using tubes or wires placed in the road) also have received judicial notice. 
However, it remains necessary to prove in court that any device was in  
proper working order and was correctly operated by a competent persorl. 
Regarding speed-trap legislation, only s few states will prohibit time- 
distance measurements, but in those states the only means of resolving this 
constraint is statutory change. In the application suggested here, the self- 
incrimination and due-process constraints might be resolved in some states 
because the subject speeding offenses a re  fldecriminalizedv and a re  
punishable by a monetary penalty only. 
There is evidence that radar-type speed sensors in themselves provide a 
deterrent threat simply by emitting electromagnetic radiation that can be 
monitored by radar detectors in vehicles. This can be viewed as .a. bonus 
effect of the automatic detection device countermeasure that  could be 
used independently or in support of the device, 
In format iona l  E lements ,  The informational components of this 
program are  relatively straightforward and should not cause difficult 
operational problems. Their most critical aspect is continuing maintenance 
of the informational activity. This in turn requires funds to support a 
permanent informational function that could be incorporated into public- 
information organizations in police departments. Many large police 
departments already have such organizations in place and could readily 
support an increased level of activity if given additional resources. 
The funds to support such an organization could be provided by the 
revenues generated by the penalties paid by the speed-law violators. It is 
common practice in many jurisdictions to set speed limits at  the 85th 
percentile speed of traffic which means that about 1596 of all traffic 
exceeds the limit, Limits set lower to reduce some other societal risk 
(e.g,, excessive consumption of energy) create still more speed-law 
violators. We estimated that at least eight billion speed-too-fast UDAs 
occur every year (Joscelyn and Jones 1980). This amounts to about 50 per 
licensed driver. A city of 1,000,000 population would be expected to have 
at least 500,000 licensed drivers committing about 25 million speed-too-fast 
UDAs per year. If o n l y  10% of these UDAs were interdicted by the 
system and resulted in $50 penalties, $125 million would become available 
each year to  support the information activity as well as other program 
elements. Reducing this number by a significant amount to allow for the 
smaller fraction of speed UDAs that are committed in urban areas would 
still leave a large amount of funds for the program. 
Action Elements. Getting legislation to support the civil-law action 
would be the first critical task to be accomplished in implementing this 
program. Some states already have statutes ffdecriminalizingfl minor traffic 
offenses. Such states might be more receptive to this program and would 
be logical locations to consider adopting it. In any case, considerable 
planning and advance work would be needed to establish the statutory basis 
for the program through a state legislature, Enabling legislation to support 
the expanded record system needed for the program also might be 
required. 
h system for notifying violators and collecting fines would have to be 
established also. This, too, would require funding support, which could be 
provided from the penalties collected from violators. 
P R O G R A M  3--ON-BOARD DETECTION A N D  WARNING OF SPEED- 
RELATED U D A s  
Description 
This program is technology-based with support by informational 
elements. Its target group is commercial vehicles operating in a variety 
of highway environments. Any level of risk appropriate to local, state, or 
federal requirements (including the 5 5  mph national maximum speed limit) 
may be defined. Program elenents are: 
e an Operating Speed Recorder (OSR) in cominercial vehicles, 
including heavy trucks, fleets of all kinds, taxis, and buses 
(element C-2); 
an On-board Speed Warning System (OSiYS) in passenger 
carriers (element C-3); 
e information to  the target  groups on the consequences of 
speeding (elern en t B-1); 
e information to passengers on where and how to report speed 
violators of vehicles in which they are riding (element B-2, 
mode 1); and 
e information to organizations that operate the target vehicles 
on the nature of and need for the program (element B-2, 
mode 2). 
Detection is accomplished by the OSRs. Speed histories are read by 
employer staff after each shift. Violators are defined in terms of vehicle 
miles traveled in excess of the speed lirnit. Special notice is taken of 
high-risk violations. Drivers with good speed records over an extended 
time period (e.g., a year) are eligible for special awards and recognition. 
Drivers with especially poor records a r e  punished by company-imposed 
monetary penalties or by dismissal. Drivers are notified periodically about 
their performance. The names of exemplary drivers are  posted in 
conspicuous places. 
Detection is further enhanced in passenger vehicles through the use of 
OSifTSs that provide a visual signal (e.g., a red light) to passengers when 
the speed limit is exceded, At ten mph over the limit an audible signal is 
given. The signal increases in intensity and pitch as the speed increases 
further. 
The informational element on the consequences of speeding is split into 
two components, one directed a t  the driver and one directed a t  the 
employer. The driver-directed component stresses appeal number 3 of 
element B-1, that the potential cost of noncompliant behavior is very high. 
The emphasis is on costs that ivill be imposed by employers for speeding. 
This is further supported by information on the rewards that can be gained 
by not speeding. The nature of the OSR and precision and reliability are 
also communicated to drivers. The communications media are  those 
appropriate to the employer organization, i.e., word of mouth through 
supervisors, flyers included in pay envelopes, bulletin board notices, posters, 
stickers on company vehicles, etc. 
The employer-directed component emphasizes appeal number 2 (that 
compliant behavior reduces the cost of operating a motor vehicle) as well 
as appeal number 3. Economic costs to the employer are the main target, 
and the components of those costs applicable to various broad classes of 
employers are identified. Humanitarian and energy conservation aspects 
are also stressed, especially in appeals  to  vehicles opera ted  by 
governmental agencies, These elements are combined to make a strong 
case for an employer's adopting the program, The cost of  the OSRs 
themselves and other programmatic costs to the employer are shown to be 
small in comparison to the economic costs due to high-speed driving by 
employers. Communication of this information and descriptive information 
about the program is accomplished through personal contact and through 
mailout of f lyers  and brochures to key executives in the target 
organizations, 
Key Feasibility and Effectiveness Issues 
D e t e c t i o n  E lements .  Hardware  f a c t o r s  a r e  c r i t i c a l  in th i s  
countermeasure, and include many of the same factors that -Nere noted in 
the discussion of automatic detection devices (countermeasure program 2). 
Installation of the OSR could occur either during assembly of the vehicle, 
l a te r  on by authorized agents of the vehicle manufacturer or OSR 
manufacturers, or by the purchaser of the device, In this application, the 
units are installed on vehicles that are already in the employer's fleet.  
Reliability and maintainability for this type equipment would likely be high, 
although periodic checkout and, possibly calibration, might be necessary. If 
the device were kept simple without elaborate displays, the cost could be 
in the range of $50 per unit. 
-4ctions to  defeat  the OSR would be a potential problem, but an 
electronic device would appear to  be inherently more secure than the 
mechanical versions used in the past. Careful design and operational 
procedures should reduce this problem to an insignificant level. 
Some opposition to the concept could be expected from certain special 
driver organizations and other user interest groups. For exarnple, unions 
might object to the device as unwarranted management 2rying and refuse 
to cooperate unless it could be shown that use of the device were fair to 
their members. 
We note that the OSR can be used to determine speed law violations 
only when the speed limit on a roadway is known during the time that the 
target vehicle is traveling that roadway. Thus, the device would best be 
used when the speed limit over the route to be traveled were a known 
constant value, or when one were concerned with some global maxirnum 
speed limit (e,g,, the 55 mph national maximum speed limit) rather than 
local maxima. 
The OSIYS has its own unique set of problems as well as problems that 
are shared with the OSR. Experience with the safety belt interlock and 
warning system shows that unpopular devices of this type are likely to be 
disconnected or removed when they becorne too annoying. We would 
expect this to be more of a problem with the OSIVS than with the OSR, 
which must maintain a continuous record of operation that is checked by 
employer personnel, Coupling the OSFVS to the OSR so that the latter 
could not work if the former did not, conceivably could discourage actions 
to defeat the OSSVS. Other means for maintaining the integrity of the 
device would have to be studied. 
Malfunctions that result in the warning being given at speeds below 55 
mph could seriously threaten the feasibility of the OSWS. A high level of 
reliability would be needed to reduce the frequency of such malfunctions. 
Cost (both initial and repair) and maintainability are also important 
factors. 
Legal factors are important to the operation of the OSFVS (e.g., civil 
liability of manufacturers for damage caused by malfunctioning OSIVSs), but 
do not appear to offer any really serious obstacle to implementation. 
Requiring drivers to use the device as a condition for reducing a Traffic 
Law System sanction (not used in this application) could raise more serious 
legal constraints, but with care, these too probably could be over corn e. 
Legislation requiring the installation of OSWSs on all  vehicles would appear 
not to be feasible unless the device could be switched off by the driver. 
Informational Elements. Two informational factors are critical to the 
success of this program. First, employers must be persuaded to adopt the 
program in their own and society's best interests, This means that strong 
economic and other rationale must be developed and disseminated to 
employers. For example, if the employer's average cost per traffic crash 
were $5,000 and the crash risk per vehicle per year were 0.1, then the 
expected cost of traffic crashes would be $500 per vehicle per year for 
that employer. If 20% of these crashes were caused by excessive speed, 
then the program would save a maximum of $100 per vehicle per year. 
This could significantly outweigh the cost of the program and could result 
in large savings over several years for companies with large numbers of 
vehicles. The challenge to the inforrriationa! component of the program is 
to convey such messages effectively without excessive cost to the advocate 
agency, 
The second factor is critical to the successful operation of the OSfVS 
element. Here, the passengers must be persuaded to report instances of 
speed violations as indicated by the warning device. They must be made 
to understand (1) the risk asociated with such violations, ( 2 )  what the  
warning signal means and how and where to report violations, (3)  that 
some useful action will be taken as a result of their reports, and (4) that 
they will incur minimal inconvenience and suffer no other costs after 
reporting a violation, 
Action Elements. The critical issue here is determining how much of 
what kinds of rewards and punishments should be imposed under what 
conditions. TVe have suggested fines and, ultimat?ly, dismissal for chronic 
speeders, but operational definitions remain to be developed. Punishment 
would have to be compatible with existing disciplinary prsctices and would 
have t o  be specif ic and f a i r ,  both  i n  s ubs t ance  and procedure .  
Coordination with unions would be necessary. 
Rewards would have to be sufficient to affect behavior. -4 f e r ~  large 
rewards  (e.g., s paid vacation, s new car)  for drivers with really 
outstanding records would appear bet ter  than many small r ewards ,  
Periodic written and spoken recognition of drivers with good records also 
would help reinforce the desired behavior. 
SUMMARY 
T h r e e  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  p r o g r a m s  i nco rpo ra t i ng  t h e  various 
countermeasure elements of Chapter Four were synthesized. The programs 
provide examples of how elements may be f i t ted  together ta  forr~l 
comprehensive programs that  provide the fundamental func t ions  of 
detection, information, and action. While none of the programs is 
represented as '10ptimal,'7 they do appear promising for many jurisdictions 
and could provide a point of departure for developing prograins tailored for 
specific applications. Considerable detailed design work would be necessary 
before any of them could be implemented. 
Program 1, increased enforcement and punitive sanctions, is aimed at a 
high-risk target group composed of heavy trucks and busses operating on 
lirnited-access highways. Detection is accomplished by state-level ?olice- 
enforcement units using the best available procedures. This detection 
capability is enhanced by a citizen reporting network that helps police find 
high-risk locations and that provides information that can be used as a 
basis for action by employers of the violators. Violators apprehended by 
the police are required to appear in court and, if found guilty, receive an 
automatic driver-license suspension and a heavy fine. Infortnation is 
provided to employers and violators on the consequences of committing this 
U D A ,  and key Traffic Law System actors and others are provided 
information on the need for and importance of the program, 
Program 2, Automatic Detection Devices, is an alternative to existing 
labor-intensive police detection of speeders. The detection devices are 
placed on busy expressways in and around a large city and identify 
automatically the violating vehicle rather than the violating driver. 
Vehicle owners are found by matching license plate numbers with vehicle 
registrations and are subjected to civil-law action consisting of a monetary 
penalty. A public information campaign prepares the public for the new 
program and continues to function throughout the operation of the  
program. 
Program 3,  on-board detection and warning of speed-related UDAs, 
uses operating speed recorders (OSR) in commercial vehicles to provide 
information to employers about the speed-violation history of drivers of 
company-operated vehicles. Commercial passenger vehicles (i.e., buses and 
taxis) have on-board speed warning systems (9SiVS) that provide visual and 
audible signals to alert passengers to  speed violations. Informat ion is 
provided to passengers to encourage them to report such violations to a 
centrol telephone number. Actions against drivers identified as speeders by 
the OSR and the OSIVS are taken by the drivers' employers. Drivers ~ i t h  
consistently good records are rewarded by their employers. Drivers with 
poor records are punished. Information on the consequences of speeding is 
provided to drivers and their employers. 
Several factors will influence the effectiveness and, in  some cases, even 
the feasibility of these programs. For example, hardware factors a re  
cri t ical  to  the success of Programs 2 and 3, l~hich rely on automatic 
detection devices, operating speed recorders, and on-board warning systems 
to  detect  speed-law violators. The citizen reporting schemes must have 
the  support of those who would do the reporting and must contail1 
safeguards against abuse. Legal factors, including the necessity for new 
legislation, are critical in  many areas. Cost factors are crucial in all of 
the programs as a re  the acceptibility of prograins to the public and to 
existing rislc-management systems. All  of the programs will require further 
detailed design and testing prior to widespread implementation. The next 
chapter discusses some major requirements for testing the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the programs. 

CHAPTER SIX 
TEST AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS 
The value or effectiveness of the countermeasure elements and 
programs described in the two preceding chapters will depend on their 
ability to  reduce the incidence of speeding and speeding-related traffic 
crashes among their target  groups. Their feasibility for use in an 
operational set t ing will depend on their ability to meet the constraints 
imposed by the environment in which they will operate. Such constraints 
include resource availability (including funds), legal factors, and the 
acceptability of the countermeasures to the public, special interest groups, 
and risk-managemeilt agencies. 
Our preliminary analysis indicates that the countermeasures identified 
here appear promising, both in achieving acceptable levels of effectiveness 
and in meeting operational constraints. Further assess:nent llltimaisly will 
require that they be implemented and operated under conditions of actual 
use. Laboratory experiinents and simulations are not feasible for such 
assessments because of the complexity of the interactions of involved 
societal and technological factors. 
This chapter discusses some of the more important general requirement; 
for field testing and evaluations, countermeasure progrsrns of the type 
outlined in this volume. Detailed test and evaluation requirements cannot 
be specified until detailed designs of countermeasure progams for specific 
app l ica t ions  have been developed. However, especially important 
requirements relevant to the three countermeasure progyarns of Chapter 
Five are indicated where appropriate to provide examples of the kind of 
detail needed in planning specific evaluation efforts (henceforth we use the 
term "evaluation" to encompass all field-test and evaluation activities). 
Three general categories of evaluation requirements are  disc~sse~cl in  
this chapter: 
e measures of effectiveness, 
e evaluation design, and 
efficiency considerations, 
The discussion of measures of effectiveness identifies variables that 
should be used to measure effects of the countermeasure program i n  
achieving program objectives. The discussion of evaluation designs deals 
with methods for determining the extent to which the countermeasure 
program rather than other factors was responsible for observed results. 
Ef f ic iency  considerat ions a r e  concerned with ways of r e l a t ing  
countermeasure results to the resources expended to obtain those results. 
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The first step in designing an evaluation effort is to define explicitly 
the objectives of the countermeasure program. Both ultimate highway 
safety objectives and intermediate or functional objectives must be 
identified. Highway safety objectives are stated in terms of risk reduction 
sought among the target group. The degree to which these objectives are 
met is called the impact of the countermeasure program. Intermediate 
objectives are stated in terms of program output or activity. The ability 
of a program to achieve its intermediate objectives is often referred to as 
its performance. 
Top-level impact measures for Program 1 (Increased Enforcement and 
Punitive Sanctions) should include: 
number of crashes of various types caused by high-risk 
speeding by the target group of drivers (i.e,, truck drivers 
and bus drivers) on the target highways, and 
e cost of such crashes. 
Impact measures for Programs 2, Automatic Detection Devices with Civil- 
Law Sanctions, and Program 3, On-Board Detection and Yarning of Speed- 
Related UDAs, should be stated similarly but in terms of the specific 
high-speed driving behavior, the specific target groups, and the specific 
locations and circumstances where countermeasure effect is desired. 
The issue of causation should be addressed to the extent permitted by 
available resources in the test jurisdictions. The simultaneous use of 
clinical and statistical methods will give the most reliable estimates. (See 
Volume I11 of this report, Jones, Treat, and Joscelyn (1980) for a discussion 
of methods  for  assess ing causation.) Jurisdictions with accident 
investigation teams operated under NHTSAfs National Accident Severity 
Study (NASS) may be able to provide support in causation assessment. 
When such resources are not available, less sophisticated assessments 
and even al ternative or ffproxytl measures may have to suffice. For 
example, most police accident reports include judgments about the causal 
factors in a traffic crash. These judgments plus associated data from the 
reports may be further analyzed by the evaluation team to provide better 
assessments of causation. Such judgments may be supported by data on 
involvement of the target behaviors and target drivers in traffic crashes 
and by data on the incidence of these behaviors among target drivers in 
the traffic stream. The latter data may be obtained through the use of 
speed measuring devices and will be provided autonatically in Program 2. 
Performance measures must be attached to each operational function of 
the program. In Chapter Five we identified three generic top-level 
functions: detection, information, and action. Detection performance for 
all countermeasure programs against the speeding U D A  is measured at  the 
highest level by the number of UDA4s detected per UD-4 committed. 
However, because detection methods tend to differ among countermeasure 
programs, performance measures for lower-level detection functions also 
will differ. Thus, a lower-level performance measures for Program 1 will 
be the number of enforcement units operating at  given times and places, 
while the number of operable automatic detection devices will be a lower- 
level performance rneasure for the detection function of Program 2, 
The top-level performance measures for the action function also will 
tend to be invariant among countermeasure programs. In all three 
programs, the measure will be the number of actions taken per U D A  
detected. The measures will begin to differ at  the next lower level of 
detai l ,  for example, when considering what kinds of actions. Thus, for 
Program 1, a measure of performance for action would be average penalty 
paid per violation charged, while for Program 3, measures would be number 
of problem-driver dismissals per problem-driver identified and number of 
rewards given per exemplary driver identified. 
The performance of the information function wil l  vary among prograins 
and even among program elements, depending on what is being attempted. 
For elements that are attempting knowledge transfer, the change in 
knowledga is the obvious measure, while change in attitudes is the measure 
for a t t i  tude-change elements. Changes in particular behaviors will be 
appropriate for some educational elements, for example, for the seminars 
of Program 2 ,  where the objective may be to have participants fulfill 
certain commitments made at  the seminars. 
EVALUATION DESIGN 
The second step of evaluation design is to select an experimental 
method for the evaluation. The objective is to specify the best way of 
determining the extent to which the countermeasure program, rather than 
some other factor, is responsible for observed changes in performance and 
impact. An experimental design leaves the least doubt about cause-and- 
effect relationship, but is the most difficult to implement in  evaluating 
societal programs. In effect, it amounts to operating two risk-management 
systems at  the same time, One system includes the program being studied 
while the other system remains unchanged. The two systms are then 
allowed to operate long enough for sufficient performance, and impact data 
can be collected for calculating an acceptably precise estimat,? of the 
probability that the observed changss i n  results were due to the new 
programs. 
We recommend that an approximation to the experimental design be 
adopted for evaluating the countermeasure programs that are of concern 
here. The particular form of this approxination or quasi-experimental 
design most appropriate to these programs is the time-series design with 
one or more comparison jurisdiciioils or comparison sites. For Program 1, 
a statewide effort, the comparison area should be one or more other states 
matched as closely as possible with the test stat3 with respect to target- 
group involvement in the UDA-caused crashes and with r e s p e c t  t o  
important environmental factors,  for example, enforcement practices, 
traffic laws, highway types, court system, etc, For Program 2 ,  a local 
effort, the cornparison jurisdiction should be another city sinilarly matched 
with the test city. Program 3 would best be designed as a statewide or 
regional effort jvith corresponding comparison areas. 
Of course, laboratory and field testing of the hardware used in Program 
2 and 3 should precede any field evaluation of the total program. In 
addition, Program 3 probably would require some preliminary feasibility 
testing because of uncertainties about the degree to which key groups 
(e.g., trucking companies, uilions) would participate in the program. A n  
alternate approach to testing Prograrn 3 would be to compare the impact 
and performance between two similar groups of trucking and/or bus 
companies, one group adopting the program and one goup  not adopting the 
program, 
Regard less  of t he  details of the evaluation design, impact and 
performance data must be collected over a large enough period of time to 
allow program activities to reach and maintain a steady-state condition. 
The requirement for a large enough sample size to enable relatively small 
changes in effectiveness measures to be detected will also have a strong 
effect on the length of the data collection. Experience indicates that at  
least two years should be allocated to the operational or "treatmentff phase 
of the program. This should be preceded by a pretest period of about one 
year duration and followed by posttest period also lasting one year. 
An interrupted tine-series model is recommended for analyzing the test 
data (see, for example, Box and Jenkins 19'70). Program effects are seen 
as changes in the effectiveness measures over time and are  related to 
various parameters thought to be associated to these changes (for example, 
number of arrests in Program 1). A similar time series is constructed for 
the com?arison area(s), and the statistical significance of the differences 
between the values of the measures for the test and comparison areas are 
calculated. 
Informational countermeasure elements are critical to any general risk- 
management strategy for the subject U D A  and have explicitly Seen 
included in the three example programs described in the preceding chapter, 
Thus, the program evaluation effort should monitor the  values of 
intermediate informational variables thought to be related to the desired 
highway-safety effects. These variables will, in general, be of two types, 
those that measure knowledge, and those that measure attitudes. Exarnples 
of the former include knowledge about the consequences of speeding, 
including the economic cost of high-speed travel (all three programs), and 
howledge about where and how to report observed speed-law violations 
(Programs 1 and 3). -4ttitudinal variables include those that measure risk 
perception (all three programs) and the importance of the actions being 
taken to reduce :isk (for example, stronger sanctions). 
These factors should be measured through surveys also conducted 
before,  during, and a f t e r  the program. Questionnaires should be 
administered to populations from the comparison areas as well as the test 
weas and analyzed to identify any significant differences that may exist 
between the two with respect to relevant knowledge and attitudes. 
EFFICIENCY CONSXDERATIONS 
The test  and evaluation effort should provide information on the 
efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the countermeasure program. 
Efficiency is defined as impact or performance per unit of resources 
expended to obtain the impact or performance. Thus, each effectiveness 
measure will, in general, have one or more counterpart efficiency 
measures. 
To compute efficiency measures, one needs to know the resources that 
are expended for the program as a function of time. The best way to 
keep track of resources is to develop and maiatain an up-ta-date functional 
description of those elements the UDA rislc-management system that aro 
affected by the countermeasure program. This involves breaking down the 
program into a hierarchy of components or functional elements. Each 
functional element is then described with respect to: 
1. how it  is performed (e.g,, what enforcement procedures are 
used in detecting speed-law violators in Program 1); 
2 ,  what it needs to accomplish its objectives (e.g., number of 
patrol units); and 
3 .  what it produces as a result of its operation (e.g., number 
of citations issued), 
Item 3 encompasses the output of the functional element, Output is 
described by the performance measures as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Item 1 is a description of the methods or procedures that are followed in 
each functional element. Item 2 provides the func t i ona l  r e sou rce  
r equ i r emen t s  of the program which are used in developing measures of 
resource expenditures. These measures become the denominator of the 
efficiency measures. 
Three categories of resource requirements should be tracked during the 
test and evaluation program: 
o personnel, 
e equipment, and 
e facilities. 
Personnel requirements are expressed in terms of how nany people with 
what tnining, experience, and skills. Equipment requirements are stated 
in terms of types and amounts of such items as patrol cars and speed- 
measuring devices. Requirements for facilities are expressed in terms of 
types and amounts of such things as office space, courtrooms, equipment 
repair shops, etc. The funds needed to pay for personnel, equipment, and 
facilities a re  also an important measure of resource requuirernents and 
form the basis of one of the  most commonly used efficiency measures, 
cost-effectiveness. 
Data or resource requirements should be collected bef~re ,  during, and 
after the countermeasure program. Both the test area and the comparison 
area(s) should provide such data, but the data from the latter will be less 
extensive than the data from the former. Comparison-ares dsts  should be 
limited to those that describe levels of activities in functional areas that 
would be expected to have an effect on impact and performance, for 
example, number of patrol units used in surveillance and detection of 
speeders. 
SUMMARY 
Three types of top-level requirements for t2s ting and evaluating 
countermeasure programs of the type described in Chapter Five were 
identified, The first type of requirements are those related to ways of 
measuring the ability of the program to accomplish highway-safety and 
intermediate objectives. 
Measures of highway safety effect (i.e., impact measures) should be 
stated in terms of crash risk reduction among an identified target group(s). 
Risk should be defined as specifically as possible, including the speed 
threshold defining the UDA, and the environmental and situational variables 
accompanying the TJDA. Indirect or proxy measures of prograin impact 
should also be used to provide additional information on the value of the 
program. A simple count of the number of UDAs, UDA-hours, or 'JDA- 
miles is the most important of the indirect measures. 
Measures of the program's effect on intermediate objectives (i.e., 
performance measures) are needed for each of the functional elements 
that make up the program. Toplevel measures of performance are stated 
in terms of detection, informational, and action objectives, Lower-level 
measures of performance are dependent upon how the many detection, 
information transfer, and action functions are accomplished, 
The second major category of top-level requirements for evaluating 
countermeasure programs deals with the design of the test and evaluation 
activity. The purpose of the evaluation design is to select and describe a 
test procedure that will maximize the likelihood of determining the extent 
to which the counter measure prograin rather than other factors were 
responsible for observed changes in impact and performance variables. A 
quasi-experimental, time-series design is recommended. In this design, the 
time varying impact and performance in a test a res  that operates the 
program is compared to that in a similar area that does not operate the 
program. Stat ist ical  tests are performed on the data to determine the 
significance of any differences in impact or performance between the test 
area and the comparison area. Past experience with highway-safety 
countermeasure programs of the type considered in this volume indicates 
that  the evaluation should be conducted over a period of at  least four 
years, including a two-year operational period and two one-year periods to 
monitor effectiveness and activity before and after the operational period. 
Longer operational periods are desirable. 
The last category of test snd evaluation requirements is concerned with 
the efficiency of the countermeasure program. Program efficiency is 
defined as impact or performance per unit of resources expended to obtain 
the impact or performance. ;Ve recommend the development ~f 9. 
comprehensive system description to provide upto-date information about 
resource expenditures. The system description is also a valuable tool for 
monitoring the procedures used in the program to help ensure that planned 
procedures are actually being followed. 

CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three unsafe driving actions (UDAs) were exanined in this study to 
develop operational definitions of the UDAs and to  identify the t raf f ic  
crash risk they present, The UDAs :vere: 
speeding, 
e following too closely, and 
driving left of center. 
It was found that only the speeding U D A  should be given high priority 
by risk management agencies. Violations of statutes relating to the other 
t i ~ o  UDAs should be enforced when observed, but the VDAs should not 
become the target of large-scale countermeasure proFaas.  Accordingly, 
subsequent efforts in the project to identify countermeasure concepts were 
directed at  the speeding UDA. 
Seven counter measure elements have been identified as having proin ise 
for  reducing the incidence of speeding UDAs (see Table 7-11, The 
coun t e rmeasu re s  include T r a f f i c  Law System, informational, and 
technological approaches, and employ all of the four basic strategies for 
influencing driver behavior described i.? Chapter Two. Target groups range 
from the very broad to the very specific, and include drivers who exceed 
the 55  mph national maximum speed limit and drivers who exceed other 
absolute and relative speed limits. User groups include vario:ls agencies of 
the Traffic Law System, other governtnental agencizs, private sector 
organizations (e.g., businesses, unions), other special groups (e.g., fraternal 
groups, automobile clubs), and private citizens. 
Our initial assessment indicates that these concepts appear feasible, but 
will need additional study prior to implementation. All of the concepts 
have elements that collld nake them unacceptable to the general public, to 
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concepts a re  potentially vulnerable to actions to defeat them, and the 
feasibility of the technological countermeasures (C-1, C-2, and C-3) hinges 
on the availability of reliable, maintainable, accurate, and economical 
hardware. Legal factors are important to the feasibility ~f sorne of the 
countermeasures (e.g., A-1 and C-1). 
To be effective and efficient, these countermeasure elements should be 
carefully integrated into the ongoing activity of existing risk-management 
systems. .4 comprehensive prograin of countermeasures should contain 
elements that perform the primary detection, informational, and action 
functions of such systems. Three possible such programs were identified in 
this report: 
P rogram 1: Increased enforcement and punitive sanctions 
against drivers of heavy trucks and buses operating at  high- 
risk speeds on limited-access highways. 
Program 2: Automatic detection devices with civil-law 
s a n c t i o n s  aga in s t  moderate-to-high-risk speede r s  on 
expressways and around large cities. 
Program 3: On-board detection and warning of speed-related 
UDAs committed by commercial vehicles. 
These programs a re  illustrative of the ways i n  which countermeasure 
elements can be combined into promising programs of wide applicability. 
Variations of these programs or completely new programs using other 
countermeasure elements could be generated to rneet the unique needs and 
conditions of specific jurisdictions. 
We recommend that NHTSA perform a design study of the above three 
programs. The objective of the study would be to  develop detailed 
program designs for application in specific jurisdictions. Key feasibility 
issues (e.g., hardware cost and reliability, statutory requirements) l~ould be 
addressed, and operational requirements (e.g., procedures, personnel, 
equipment, facilities, cost) would be set forth. 
The study would be performed in two phases for each program. Phase 
I would develop a preliminary design and de te rmine  the  genera l  
requirements and overall feasibility of the program. Several jurisdictions 
would be considered as candidate sites for the program. One of these 
jurisdictions would be selected for the development of the detailed design 
for the program. This would occur in Phase 11. 
The results of the design study would be used to determine whether the 
programs should be implemented and evaluated, A decision to proceed 
would lead to a test-and-evaluation phase. 'vVe recommend the use of a 
quasi-experimental, time-series design with comparison areas for evaluating 
the programs. The design study would provide the system descriptions 
needed as a baseline for the evaluation. 
The amount of time required for the design study would depend on the 
outcome of Phase I of the study. For example, it might be determined 
that additional time were needed for hardware development or refinement, 
or that new legislation were required. Time for meeting these needs 
would have to be alloqvved for in Phase I1 or an intermediate phase, 
We emphasize that all of the countermeasure concepts recommended 
here are directed at  driving acts or omissions that are conscious and 
intentional, The UDAs are the result of decisions made almost entirely 
through a nondeliberate, informal process. Understanding this process is 
essential to developing effective countermeasures against speed-related and 
other UDAs. Yet, very little research has been directed toward developing 
an understanding of human decision-making processes vis-a-vis traffic crash 
risk, X recent NHTS-A contract entitled, "Identification of Motivstions for 
Unsafe Driving Actions and Potential Countermeasuresfl is a step toward 
this end, but much more is needed. We recommend that NHTSA develop a 
research program area dealing explicitly with this topic. Such a program 
should be carefully coordinated with other federally sponsored research in 
this area, for example, programs at the Department of Defense and the 
National Science Foundation. 
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